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Book Review
LAW'S EMPIRE By Ronald Dworkin. Harvard University Press 1986.
I. INTRODUCTION
Its noble calling notwithstanding, the history of jurisprudence
may be likened to the familiar childhood game, "King of the Moun-
tain." The objective for the participants is to dethrone the prevail-
ing doctrine or "ruling theory" of legal philosophy, so that one's
own theory may ascend to its place as the rightful ruler of law's em-
pire. The line of successful aspirants began with Plato and his doc-
trine of the philosopher king,' meandered through the natural law
and social contract theorists of the Enlightenment,2 and continued
into modern times with Blackstone 3 and his ambitious utilitarian
usurper, Bentham.' Bentham's utilitarian heirs-Austin,5 Holmes,6
I. See PLATO, The Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO (E. Hamilton &
H. Cairn eds. 1961).
2. See, e.g., J. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (B. Radice & R. Baldick eds. 1968);
T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Clarendon Press 1965); J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERN-
MENT (P. Laslett ed. 1964); MONTESOuIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (T. Nugent trans.
1949).
3. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A FACSIMILE OF THE
FIRST EDITION OF 1765-1769 (Univ. Chicago Press 1979). For a recent discussion of this
work, see Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 209
(1979).
4. See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLA-
TION (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds. 1970). For a brief historical account of Bentham's
lifelong and ultimately successful effort to overturn Blackstone's model ofjudges as liv-
ing, backward-looking oracles of ancient societal customs, see R. POSNER, THE ECONOM-
ICS OF JUSTICE 13-47 (1981).
5. SeeJ. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832). It is note-
worthy that Hobbes, in his unfinished A Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a Student of the
Common Laws of England (1681), developed a "command" theory of law that anticipated
many features of Austin's analytical jurisprudence. In his Dialogue, Hobbes attacked the
common-law system of precedents, which was then much admired by Bacon and Lord
Coke, and argued instead that law is the bare declaration of a sovereign authority, with
no logically necessary connection to either reason or custom.
6. See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). Legal realists, such
as Holmes and Pound, thought that the proper, unobscured understanding of the social
phenomenon of law requires a sociological or historical approach that looks behind ju-
risprudential arguments and puzzles. The proper questions of this study focus on the
way in which judges are influenced by class consciousness and economic circumstance.
Dworkin argues that this view
asks for social realism, but the kind of theory it recommends is unable to pro-
vide it. Of course, law is a social phenomenon. But its complexity, function,
and consequence all depend on one special feature of its structure. Legal prac-
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and, more recently, Hart 7 -have each acceded to the throne of An-
glo-American jurisprudence by successively brandishing increas-
ingly refined accounts of legal realism and positivism.
As the ruling theory, positivism distinguished sharply between
the descriptive or positive aspect of law and its moral legitimacy:
what law is is a wholly empirical matter, determined by discovering
what the legal institutions of society, in particular the legislature and
the courts, say it is. Further, whether the coercive enforcement of a
law is politically legitimate depends solely upon whether the formal,
institutional rulemaking procedures recognized by a society for pro-
pounding law have been followed in that particular case. If so, posi-
tivism allows the state to legitimately coerce its citizens to comply
with even a morally unjust law. Thus, moral and political legitimacy
are divorced: what the law can require is not in any principled way
constrained or determined by the necessity of recognizing certain
moral, political, or legal rights of individual citizens as a condition
precedent to the legitimate political coercion of those citizens.'
Since what the law ought to be is left entirely to considerations
of utilitarian policy, rights are accordingly reduced to political in-
strumentalities that protect individuals only insofar as doing so max-
imizes the benefits that inure to society. For Bentham and his
followers, the notion of natural rights-political claims fundamen-
tice, unlike many other social phenomena, is argumentative. Every actor in the
practice understands that what it permits or requires depends on the truth of
certain propositions that are given sense only by and within the practice; the
practice consists in large par in deploying and arguing about these proposi-
tions. People who have law make and debate claims about what law permits or
forbids that would be impossible--because senseless-without law and a good
part of what their law reveals about them cannot be discovered except by notic-
ing how they ground and defend these claims. . . . (Study of law from] the
internal point of view of those who make [legal] claims . . . is practical, in ex-
actly the way the present objection ridicules. They do not want predictions of
the legal claims they will make but arguments about which of these claims is
sound and why; they want theories not about how history and economics have
shaped their consciousness but about the place of these disciplines in argument
about what the law requires ....
•[Tihe historian cannot understand law as a[n argumentative] social prac-
tice, even enough to reject it as deceptive, until he has a participant's under-
standing, until he has his own sense of what counts as a good or bad argument
within that practice .... Theories that ignore ... the internal character of legal
argument [offer] explanations [that] are impoverished and defective, like in-
numerate histories of mathematics, whether they are written in the language of
Hegel or Skinner.
R. DwORKIN. LAw's EMPIRE 13-14 (1986) [hereinafter L.Aw's EMPIRE].
7. See H. HART, THE CONCEPT oF LAw (1961).
8. See id. at 181-82.
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tally independent of or even counterpoised to the welfare of society
and valid even if they do not find expression in society's laws-was
regarded as "nonsense on stilts." 9 Moreover, the considered utilita-
rian policies that would be adopted by an enlightened, broadly dem-
ocratic society would find their clearest expression in the collective
pronouncements of that society's political institutions-particularly
the legislatures. Hence, Bentham and his followers believed judicial
determination of what the law is to be a matter of empirically discov-
ering what legal imperatives had been institutionally "posited" and
this enterprise was to be carried out in a normatively neutral, de-
tached fashion. Thus, what the law ought to be according to the
shared moral values of the political community has no logical bear-
ing on what the law is. Of course, judges could invoke common-law
precedents and common-law principles of equity and construction;
and they could search the text of a statute for its plain meaning or, if
that was unavailing, they could attempt to divine legislative intent.
But, according to the positivist model, adjudication did not and
properly could not rely on constructive interpretations of the law
that engaged a judge's moral and political value judgments or con-
victions. That enterprise was properly relegated to the legislature
and subject to popular political constraints.
This ruling positivist-utilitarian coalition was firmly entrenched
on the summit of Anglo-American jurisprudence when Ronald
Dworkin launched his assault on it a decade ago in Taking Rights Seri-
ously. " Since then, Dworkin has with subsequent essays'" continued
his ascent, permanently changing the landscape of issues on the way
and making the necessary inroads to lay the groundwork for a new
liberal jurisprudence.
In Law's Empire Dworkin makes his final assault on the summit,
dislodging legal positivism and two related theories of adjudication,
conventionalism and pragmatism. In their place, he develops a rich
and sophisticated theory ofjurisprudence. He begins by addressing
what he takes to be the crucial question that any adequate theory of
jurisprudence must answer: In hard cases, how do judges actually
decide what the law is, and how should they decide what the law is?
9. J. BENTHAM, ANARCHICAL FALLACIES, BEING AN EXAMINATION OF THE DECLARATION
OF RIGHTS ISSUED DURING THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1791).
10. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
11. Most of these have been collected in R. DWORKIN, A MATT-ER OF PRINCIPLE
(1985). Dworkin's theory of interpretation in A Maler of P inciple is critically reviewed
from the perspective of contemporary literary theory in Lane, The Poetics of Legal Interpre-
tation. 87 COLUM. L. REV. 197 (1987).
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Thus, the theory has a positive aspect that takes seriously adjudica-
tive disagreement and attempts to provide the best explanation of
what judges say and actually do in deciding hard cases. More im-
portantly, the theory is pervasively normative as well. Judges are
not free to make law or to invent rights.' 2 Instead, they must inter-
pret what the law is by applying conflicting precedents in a manner
that makes the entire body of our law the best it can be. Unlike
conventionalism or pragmatism, this normative enterprise engages
judges in both a constrained and constructive interpretation and ap-
plication of those legal principles that have guided the development
of black letter law in particular areas of dispute. The determination
and application of these interpretively reconstructed legal principles
are constrained exclusively neither by the demand that courts pro-
tect those societal expectations engendered by a conventional read-
ing of the law, nor by a pragmatic concern to promote social welfare
without the appearance ofjudicial activism. Instead, the principle of
choice for the legitimate adjudication of hard cases will generally be
the one that best promotes the political virtue of integrity-the vir-
tue of treating citizens of the community equally under the law.
This sense of integrity requires the community to treat its past polit-
ical decisions as commitments to principles for guiding its present
decisions. Indeed, if in adjudicating hard cases judges do not take
the same care to preserve integrity as they do the other political vir-
tues ofjustice, fairness, and procedural due process, the subsequent
coercion of citizens pursuant to those decisions will fail the acid test
of political legitimacy.
II. THEORETICAL DISAGREEMENT AND THE SEMANTIC STING
Dworkin begins Law's Empire by dismissing two current disputes
that he contends are misguided and impede the development of a
substantive theory about the nature of law. The first of these is a
practical political debate about whether judges should be activists
or, alternatively, should exercise restraint. Dworkin rejects this
characterization of legal disagreement within (and outside) the
courts because it mistakenly assumes that those judges deemed to
12. The historical antecedents of Dworkin's view can be traced at least to Bacon's
claim that "[jiudges ought to remember that their office isjus dicere, and notjus dare, to
interpret law, and not to make law, or give law." F. BACON, EssAYs: OF JUDICATURE
(1625). But rf. Austin, Statule and Judiciary Law, in 2 LECTURES ONJURISPRUDENCE 620 (R.
Campbell ed. 1885) (noting that judges employ the fiction that common law is not made
by them but merely declared from time to time); B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THEJUDI-
CEAL PROCESS 124 (1921) (observing that the power to declare law carries with it the
power to make law when none exists).
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be activists knowingly ignore the law and put in its place their own
convictions about justice, rights, or policy. Dworkin insists that re-
ducing judicial disagreement to an issue of "fidelity to law" ob-
scures the real, more profitable debate about what the law that
governs hard cases actually is. Dworkin convincingly supports his
contention by examining the majority and dissenting opinions
found in some classic hard cases. 3 The language and reasoning of
these decisions seem to suggest that all of the authors believed that
they had correctly interpreted the law at issue and that the dissent-
ingjudges were mistaken as to what the law actually required. Even
if Dworkin is guilty of underestimating the number of judges who
sometimes rule with fingers crossed, the general force of his claim is
hard to deny without discarding the interpretive "principle of char-
ity'' 1 4 in favor of a pervasive legal cynicism.15
13: Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506,22 N.E. 188 (1889); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); McLoughlin v. O'Brian [1983] A.C.
410, reversing [1981) Q.B. 599.
14. The interpretive principle of charity is
[tihe maxim of translation ... that assertions start[ilingly [sic] false on the face
of them are likely to turn on hidden differences of language .... The common
sense behind the maxim is that one's interlocutor's silliness, beyond a certain
point, is less likely than bad translation-or, in the domestic case, linguistic
divergence.
W. QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 59 (1960). See also Wilson, Substances Without Substrata, 12
REV. METAPHYSICS 521-39 (1959) (We select as designatum that individual which will
make the largest possible number of statements true.). The principle, as applied to the
normative or evaluative aspect of legal and political theory, might be stated thus: select
that interpretation of the enterprise (i.e., the precedents taken collectively, as the histori-
cal summation of the exercise of political power) which will cohere or fit with individual
cases in a way that commends to us the largest possible number of cases.
15. See Hutchinson, Indiana Dworkin and Law's Empire, 96 YALE LJ. 637 (1987) [here-
inafter Indiana Dworkin]. Hutchinson aligns himself with the Critical Legal Studies move-
ment, and has argued that the law of accidents illustrates the indeterminacy of rules and
principles in the law. The indeterminacy thesis holds that the existence of a principle
and its counter-principle in law (e.g., one is liable only for reasonably foreseeable dam-
age vs. the tortfeasor who must take the victim as found) shows that these principles are
contradictory, and that our law expresses two mutually inconsistent visions of our soci-
ety. See Hutchinson, Of Kings and Dirty Rascals: The Struggle for Democracy, 1985 QUEENS
L.J. 273, 281-83. Dworkin argues that the indeterminacy thesis is based on a logical
mistake:
[T]he confident assignment of the two principles to two contradictory "visions"
of society is procrustean and groundless. These principles are inevitable as-
pects of any decent response to the world's complexity. They differ only in
their distribution of the risk of loss between two actors ... and it is implausible
to suppose that someone who makes that choice differently in different kinds of
circumstances, fixing the loss on the actor in some and on the victim in another,
is for that reason morally schizophrenic .... [So there is] no difficulty in ac-
cepting both at the level of abstract principle. These principles are sometimes
competitive, but they are not contradictory.
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Similarly, there is currently a theoretical argument, rooted in
British analytical jurisprudence, tfiat explains legal disagreement as
the result of mere semantic confusion. Dworkin argues that this po-
sition is misguided because adopting it forces us to trivialize dis-
putes between lawyers or judges. What the law is, in this view, is a
matter of "plain fact." Hence, disagreements are explained in one
of two ways: either the disputants are arguing past each other be-
cause they have unwittingly settled on conflicting definitions of fun-
damental legal concepts or, alternatively, the disputants have
unwittingly stumbled into an argument about what the law should
be. Thus, on this "plain fact" view, genuine substantive disputes
about what the law is are exhaustively empirical. They are settled by
merely "looking in the book" and cannot require judges, even in
hard cases, to view conflicting precedents through a normative, in-
terpretive lens.
According to Dworkin, adherents to this prevailing view have
been paralyzed by what he calls the "semantic sting." They picture
meaningful disagreement as possible "only if we all accept and fol-
low the same criteria for deciding when our claims are sound.', 6
Thus, if meaningful disagreement breaks down to the extent that
disputants accept and follow different normative criteria, then genu-
ine theoretical, rather than empirical, disputes about what law is will
be impossible when those disputes arise from conflicting moral and
legal norms. Dworkin argues that the existence of conflict in hard
cases between competing normative legal criteria does not support
the semantic theorist's inference of global skepticism about the pos-
sibility of having and thus resolving genuine theoretical disputes
about law. The disputants' failure to share all of their normative
legal criteria does not by itself show that the legal principles that
they do share are insufficient to afford them a principled means for
agreeing on the correct or best resolution of the dispute. After all,
the disputants may even share the competing normative criteria and
agree on their application in easier cases. If so, their conflict in hard
cases is not conclusive evidence that the disputants are relying on
inconsistent or incompatible norms. If the disputants also share a
decisionmaking procedure that explains their agreement about how
to order those norms in easier cases, then the competing legal
norms may be commensurate and the disputants may have at their
LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 441-44 n.20. For Dworkin's general discussion of Critical
Legal Studies, see id. at 271-75.
16. LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 15, at 45.
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disposal a means for approaching consensus in the more difficult
cases.
Nevertheless, a question remains about how much divergence
in basic normative legal criteria and political values is compatible
with the practical possibility of reaching a principled resolution of a
genuine theoretical dispute about the proper interpretation of law.
If it is possible for semantic legal theorists to have missed the mark
so long and so completely, as Dworkin contends,' 7 then it is surely
conceivable that some disputes will on occasion arise from a conflict
of normative legal criteria that seems so intractable as not to admit
practically of resolution by appeal to shared principles of a higher
order that yield agreement on the "best" interpretation of the law.'s
Hence, the possibility that an omniscient judge with Olympian legal
prowess could interpret conflicting legal precedent so as to provide
the best principled resolution of the dispute is scant comfort to
those mortals laboring in the trenches of law. They seek the practi-
cal but elusive decisionmaking procedure of a mechanical jurispru-
dence: one that minimizes apparently intractable legal conflict
through the application of priority rules that individually resemble
the rules of statutory construction insofar as they can be applied
mechanically in easy cases, but collectively differ from the rules of
construction insofar as they severally advance just the kinds of equi-
table considerations, policies, and conceptions of institutional fair-
ness that seem to conflict intractably in hard cases. Thus, some
caution is in order. Even assuming arguendo that there is a right an-
swer, as a matter of law, for every hard case, it does not follow that
such answers will always be practically demonstrable.' 9 So the claim
17. See id. at 101-04. Dworkin discusses the long-standing verbal dispute between
Positivists and Natural Law theorists concerning whether the Nazis had law. Positivists
held that the Nazis did have law but argued that it should have been disobeyed by Ger-
man citizens because it was immoral. Natural law theory, on the other hand, held that
Nazi statutes and court decisions were patently immoral and, therefore, they did not
count as laws. Hence, there was no reason to obey them. Dworkin suggests that the
disputants here argue at cross purposes-they do not entertain a genuine theoretical
dispute-because they have addressed the wrong issue. The real issue is not whether
the Nazis had law, but whether (1) German citizens had a political obligation to obey the
laws and (2) the state could legitimately compel obedience to its laws. Id.
18. It may be that Dworkin would agree on this point but would advocate shifting the
burden of proving that a particular disagreement was not a genuine theoretical dispute
to the semantic theorist, because the risk of unacceptable trivialization of disagreement
that would otherwise result ought to create a presumption in favor of a genuine theoreti-
cal disagreement. For an earlier account of Dworkin's views on theoretical disagreement
in hard cases, see R. DWORKIN, Hard Cases and Can Rights Be Controversial?, in TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81, 279 (1977).
19. For an earlier argument for the claim that hard cases have right answers, even if
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that hard cases have right answers will be of limited use in deciding
what those answers are. The generalforce, however, of Dworkin's
attack on semantic legal theories remains intact: no realistic account
of theoretical legal disagreement- can routinely view disputants as
playing a game of legal charades."
III. LAW AS AN INTERPRETIVE CONCEPT
Having drawn the semantic sting, Dworkin argues that law is an
interpretive concept. In arguing and deciding hard cases, ordinary
citizens, lawyers, and judges must read the law with an interpretive
attitude. According to Dworkin, the interpretive attitude has two
distinct and independent components.2' First, the interpretive atti-
tude assumes that rule-governed social practices such as courtesy
not only exist but also have value because they have a purpose. 2
Second, the judgments and conduct required by the rules of that
practice are not limited by the history of the practice but are sensi-
tive to its point. Thus, the interpretive attitude introduces an ele-
ment of purposive flexibility into the future construction and
application of the rules governing the practice; interpreters impose
meaning on the practice in an effort to view it in its best light and,
having done this, they reconstruct the practice in light of that
meaning.
A. Conversational vs. Constructive Interpretation
Dworkin distinguishes two major approaches to interpretation.
Conversational interpretation involves attributing meaning to the
speech or writings of another in order to determine what has been
said. Creative interpretation is concerned with interpreting some-
no procedure exists in principle for demonstrating the legal rights of the parties, see R.
DWORKIN, Can Rights be Controversial?, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 279 (1977).
20. For criticism of Dworkin's account of the participant's internal point of view and
his attack on semantic theories of law, see Soper, Dworkin's Domain, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1166, 1172-76 (1987).
21. LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 46-48.
22. Id. at 47. For a related view, see L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964), which
argues that formalistic treatments of law are inadequate, because they fail to account for
the fact that legal institutions are essentially purposive collections of rules designed and
intended to advance human interests and values. Fuller's views on morality in law con-
tinue to command critical attention. See Wueste, Fuller's Processual Philosophy of Law, 71
CORNELL L. REV. 1205-30 (1986); R.S. SUMMERS, LON L. FULLER (1984), reviewed in Le-
Bel, Blame This Messenger. Summers on Fuller, 83 MIcH. L. REV. 717 (1985). For a compari-
son of Dworkin's views on the nature of adjudication with those of Fuller, see Winston,
Taking Dworkin Seriously, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 201 (1978), and Fuller, The Forms and
Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
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thing created by people-such as art objects or social practices-as
distinct entities with a life and purpose of their own. Dworkin ac-
knowledges, however, that there is a deep connection 2- between the
creative interpretation of social practices, or of works of art or law,
and the conversational interpretation of a speaker's remarks: both
kinds of interpretation are concerned with attributing purposes,
rather than mere causes, to their objects. Moreover, the interpreta-
tion of conversation also involves employing. presumptions, such as
the principle of charity, so as to make the author's remarks intelligi-
ble and plausible. Thus, both kinds of interpretation try to make
their objects the best they can be. But Dworkin argues that creative
interpretation is not conversational but constructive.24 Constructive
interpretation is concerned essentially not with the purposes of the
author but with those of the interpreter; it is an activity in which the
interpreter imposes purpose on an object.or practice in order to
make it the best possible example of its form or genre. The avail-
able interpretations, however, and thus the interpretive activity it-
self, are constrained by the history and form of the practice or work
of art. Thus, the constructive interpreter is not free to make the
practice better than the best it can be, let alone anything he or she
likes.
Following Cavell,25 Dworkin rejects the thesis that creative in-
terpretation in the arts properly aims to discover the author's con-
scious historical intention. The extent to which the best
interpretation of a work of art must be faithful to the author's histor-
ical intention will depend upon whether accepting the author's in-
tention will permit interpretation to make the art object the best it
can be."6 Similarly, the purpose or point to which the internal struc-
ture of an argumentative social practice is directed must be logically
distinguished from the intentions or purposes of individual partici-
pants in that practice, since their claims and arguments are about
what the practice means and not about what they mean.27 Because
trying to decide what other members of the community believe the
social practice requires can be distinguished from determining what
the practice itself really requires, the conversational interpretive at-
titude appropriate to the former inquiry will be inappropriate in in-
23. LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 53.
24. Id. at 52. See generally J. HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
(1984); H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (G. Barden &J. Cumming trans. 2d ed. 1975).
25. S. CAVELL, MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? 213-37 (1969).
26. Lw's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 62.
27. Id. at 63.
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terpreting the practice itself. This is true, Dworkin suggests, even if
we could ascribe to the community itself beliefs or convictions about
what the practice required. In this case, we must still distinguish
between what the community believes the practice requires and
what the practice really requires."
Dworkin's argument, which relies on an ontology that permits
purposes to actually subsist in the social practices themselves, as dis-
tinct from the community or persons who engage in those practices,
is unconvincing for two reasons. First, the argument seems to allow
that a community's belief about what that community's social prac-
tice requires could be mistaken-that the community itself, and not
merely those individuals who are its members, could in effect be
deceived about what its own social practices really require. This im-
plication appears to commit Dworkin to the view that creative inter-
pretation can provide individuals who are internal to the community
practice with a vantage point on that practice epistemically superior
to that of the community itself. If this view is correct, then a disa-
greement between two constructive interpreters within the commu-
nity about the purpose or principle behind a practice or a set of
precedents could not be settled by appeal to the community's be-
liefs about the purpose or requirements of its own practice, as un-
derstood through a conversational interpretation of that
community's beliefs about that practice.
Second, Dworkin's argument overlooks a crucial point. If the
community personified can have beliefs or convictions about what
its practices require of its members, and if it must be capable of
agency, as Dworkin argues,29 then that personified community can
have a purpose in adopting or retaining a practice and can itself
make demands or requirements on its members through that prac-
tice. Thus, the community personified must itself have the last
word, conversationally interpreted, on the purpose and require-
ments of its practices. This follows from the paradigmatic primacy
of ascribing purposes to agents or persons rather than to objects or
social practices. Language that predicates purposes of objects or
social practices is not quite metaphorical, but it is derivative of and
dependent on our practice of attributing purposes to those persons
who would use the objects or who would adopt or engage in the
social practices. Hence, the heuristic primacy of conversational in-
terpretation for the purpose of ascertaining the point of a commu-
28. Id. at 64-65.
29. Id. at 167-75.
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nity's practices undermines Dworkin's claim that creative
interpretation alone provides authoritative access to the purposes
behind those social practices adopted by a community personified.
B. The Analysis of Constructive Interpretation
According to Dworkin, there are three analytical stages in-
volved in constructive interpretation. 0 In the pre-interpretive stage
the interpreter compiles an inventory of beliefs or convictions about
what counts as part of the practice to be interpreted. Thus, the
rules or standards defining the practice are identified. In the inter-
pretive stage the interpreter determines a general justification or
purpose for the central features of the defined practice. Finally, in
the post-interpretive or reform stage, the interpreter revises his or
her understanding of what the practice really requires in order to
promote the purpose or justification accepted at the interpretive
stage.3  But Dworkin also describes the post-interpretive or reform
stage as one in which the interpreter arrives at a substantive convic-
tion "about which kinds of justification really would show the prac-
tice in the best light."13 2
Dworkin's two formulations of the post-interpretive stage, how-
ever, appear occasionally to drive the interpreter to make different
and conflicting interpretations. Suppose that a judge determines at
the interpretive stage that the purpose best promoted historically by
a body of precedent is unjust. Under the first formulation of the
post-interpretive stage, the judge would be required to revise the
understanding of those precedents so as better to promote, in appli-
cation, their unjust purpose. On the other hand, the second formu-
lation would require the judge to adjust the understanding of how
best to apply an existing body of precedent so as to impose upon it a
more just but less historically faithful purpose.
This tension can never be adequately resolved because a prior,
related difficulty arises if one tries clearly to distinguish Dworkin's
interpretive and post-interpretive stages, understood as stages of in-
terpretation. If the purpose discerned in or imposed upon a practice
or body of precedent was rationally determined, then activity at the
interpretive stage must be rule-guided. 3 But if that interpretive ac-
30. Id. at 65-68.
31. Id. at 66.
32. Id. at 67.
33. Although rational activity must be rule-guided, this paradoxically does not mean
that conduct that constitutes following a rule (or action taken pursuant to a rule) is
wholly determinate or can be predicted by criteria specified in advance. Indeed, it has
19881 567
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tivity is itself bound both by constraints of fit-the minimally accept-
able degree of coherence with precedent-and by normative rules
such as the interpretive principle of charity, then the interpretive
stage will necessarily show the practice or precedents in the best
light; that is, it will already show "why a practice of that general
shape is worth pursuing, if it is."'3 4 If this view is correct, then noth-
ing is left to do after the interpretive stage except either to adopt the
rule or to reject it in pursuit of extra-interpretive reform. Thus, any
sharp analytical distinction between reading and interpretive reform
breaks down because these activities are both inseparable compo-
nents of the interpretive stage. Consequently, the activity that re-
mains for Dworkin's post-interpretive stage is not one that many
judges will easily recognize to be part of the interpretive enterprise.
From their perspective-one internal to the legal practice of con-
struing precedents-post-interpretive politics surely goes beyond
making the law the best it can be in its concern to make the law better
than it is.
C. Skepticism About Morality and Interpretation
This result is natural and inescapable because Dworkin first
contends that judges, even in hard cases, are properly concerned
with what the law is, and then argues that empirical discovery does
not provide the correct model for judicial inquiry. Hence, the pro-
cess of arriving at the law through constructive interpretation is
more closely akin to deciding what the right answer is to some con-
troversial moral issue: one proceeds by way of discursive normative
argument with other members of the moral community. Since skep-
ticism about ethics is widely thought to undermine the defensibility
been persuasively argued that it is impossible to state exhaustively criteria that can es-
tablish authoritatively whether or not a rule is being followed. Thus, rational rule-guided
behavior can be distinguished from determinate rule-governed behavior (e.g., planetary
motion in conformity with the laws of physics). This does not show, as the Realists and
members of Critical Legal Studies suppose, that legal rules are wholly indeterminate.
This is because the solution to the paradox is to eschew the quest for necessary and
sufficient truth conditions for the statement, "[t]hejudge is following the rule," in favor
of an account that grounds the justification for asserting such a statement in the under-
standing and practices of the interpretive community of the speaker. See L. WTrrGEN-
STEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL I.NVESTIGATIONS (2d ed. 1958). For a contemporary discussion of
Wittgenstein's views on "rule-skepticism," see R. FOGELIN, WITrGENSTEIN 138-71
(1976), and a more recent elaboration of Fogelin's arguments in S. KRIPKE, WITrGEN-
STEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE (1982), reviewed in Yablon, Book Review, 96
YALE L.J. 613 (1987). For critical discussions of rule-skepticism that are particularly per-
tinent to the indeterminacy thesis, see G. BAKER & P. HACKER, SCEPTICISM, RULES AND
LANGUAGE (1984), and Luban, Legal Modernism, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1656, 1690-93 (1986).
34. LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 66.
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of moral discourse, Dworkin anticipates a similar skeptical challenge
to constructive interpretation. Skepticism about interpretation is
the view that all interpretive claims are subjective; therefore, no in-
terpretation is ever best or superior to others.35
To defeat this skeptical challenge, Dworkin adopts a "divide
and conquer" strategy. First, Dworkin defines internal skepticism as
skepticism within the interpretive enterprise or within the enterprise
of advancing normative arguments in support of a particular posi-
tion. 6 Thus, the internal skeptic relies on the soundness of certain
widely shared interpretive principles or moral judgments to per-
suade us that a particular practice does not have a coherent point or
that a particular moral or legal issue does not admit of a defensible
answer relative to our community's background consensus. The in-
ternal skeptic will advance interpretive considerations or normative
arguments to support this contention. Next, Dworkin distinguishes
external skepticism as a metaphysical theory about the interpretive
enterprise, or outside of normative ethical discourse, that holds that
all interpretations and moral judgments are subjective.37 On this
view, interpretations and moral judgments are merely projections
that fail to refer to any objective, discoverable reality.
Having thus split their ranks, Dworkin would vanquish skeptics
with their own inconsistency. External skeptics mistakenly think
their attack has the force of internal skepticism, i.e., that external
skepticism justifies the claim that we should not talk or act as if any
one interpretation or moral judgment is right to the exclusion of
others. Dworkin argues that external skeptics cannot consistently
make this latter claim because it is itself a normative claim and must
be defended from a position internal to the enterprise of making and
evaluating particular normative arguments. 38 Since external skepti-
cism provides no reason internal to an interpretive practice to re-
tract or modify legal interpretation or a moral judgment, it cannot
threaten any, let alone every, interpretive or normative project.
Moreover, one ready to defend some interpretive or moral claim-
35. Id. at 76. For a general discussion of and debate over creative interpretation, see
Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, in THu POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 249 (W. Mitchell ed.
1983); Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L. REv.
551 (1982); Dworkin, My Reply to Stanley Fish (and Walter Benn Michaels): Please Don't Talk
About Objectivity Any More, in THE POLITICS OF INTERPRETATION 287 (W. Mitchell ed.
1983); Fish, l1rong Again, 62 TEX. L. REV. 299 (1983).
36. LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 78-79.
37. Id. at 79-80.
38. Id. at 82-84.
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such as that genocide is wrong-cannot consistently take up the de-
fense of global internal skepticism.
Although Dworkin is correct that global internal skepticism
provides a heavy intellectual burden for its adherents, his dismissal
of external skepticism is much less satisfying. While external skepti-
cism provides no reason to modify our particular legal interpreta-
tions or moral convictions, it does provide grounds for their
wholesale reclassification: none of our interpretations or convic-
tions are objective, empirical claims about the way the world is.- 9
The external skeptic need not assert that we should not talk or act as
though one interpretation or normative claim is superior to others.
Instead, he doubts that a coherent account can be given of what it
means to say that one interpretation is objectively the best among all
contenders when the interpretations of a particular community are
not neutral, relative to those of other communities, insofar as all
interpretations impose a particular set of culturally shared values on
a social practice. The unavailability of such an account does not
provide a ground for levelling all of the competing interpretations
or normative claims that vie for dominance within a particular inter-
pretive community. Relative to those judgments shared within a
particular community, some interpretations will provide a superior
fit with those judgments than do others. But this result provides
scant satisfaction or reassurance for those who want to understand
and defend the claim that our laws are, in this external sense, objec-
tively better than those, for example, of the Nazis. Merely to assert
that they are, relative to those values shared by our community,
begs the question. Dworkin seems committed to accepting this im-
passe when he contends that the political virtues are not external to
sovereigns and that "[i]ntegrity holds within political communities,
not among them."4
39. Id. at 79-80.
40. Id. at 208-15. On this and a related point, Bruce Ackerman notes that
[i]n considering this question [whether it makes sense to insist that power be
mediated through neutral dialogue], we are no longer examining the kinds of argu-
ment that are admissible within the practice of liberal politics. What is at stake now is the
justification of the entire practice of liberal argument, considered as a whole. Moreover,
Hart and Rawls have taught us to recognize the importance of this shift in con-
versational key. As they have argued persuasively, there is no reason to insist that
the reasons advanced in support of an entire practice be identical to those that are admissible
within the practice. Applying their point to the present problem: while Neutrality
excludes a broad range of normative argument from the practice of liberal poli-
tics, it does not follow that these arguments should also be excluded when the
subject is the justification of the entire practice of liberal argument, considered
as a whole. Indeed, it would be a category mistake to imagine that there could
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This impasse shows not that there is deep error in the interpre-
tive attitude, but that those same features of the attitude that enable
it to do its work relative to a set of shared community values also
preclude it from settling interpretive disputes between communities
insofar as their moral and political values are incommensurate.4'
Nevertheless, Dworkin does argue convincingly that lawyers and
other members of the political community who argue in support of
particular interpretations of the law cannot then consistently appeal
to external skepticism to support a global internal skepticism about
interpretation of the law.
IV. EVALUATING COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF LAW
Having rebuffed the skeptic and articulated the sense in which
law is an interpretive concept, Dworkin makes a pivotal move by di-
recting the interpretive attitude to legal practice as a whole. The
most abstract and fundamental point of legal practice, he argues,
is to guide and constrain the power of government in the
following way. Law insists that force not be used or with-
held, no matter how useful that would be to the ends in
view ... except as licensed or required by individual rights
and responsibilities flowing from past political decisions
about when collective force is justified.42
Thus, any adequate conception of law and adjudication will not only
have to account for the way judges actually decide hard cases, but it
will also have to account for this central purpose of legal practice-
the legitimization of political coercion by reference to prior political
decisions justifying the state's exercise or restraint of power. Of the
various conceptions of law -that might be held up to this standard,
Dworkin considers three: conventionalism, pragmatism, and law as
integrity. Conspicuous by their absence from this list are natural law
theories, which provide that citizens have inherent political rights
against the state regardless of whether legal institutions expressly
recognize those rights. Such a notable absence may be explained by
the fact that Dworkin's interpretive formulation of the central point
of legal practice-the legitimization of legal coercion only where in-
be a Neutral justification for the practice of Neutral justification-for Neutrality
makes no sense except as a part of the practice it constitutes.
Ackerman, |l'hat Is Neutral About Neutrality?, 93 ETHICS 372, 387 (1983) (citing H. HART,
Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968);
Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955) (emphasis added)).
41. See B. WILLIAMS, The Truth in Relativism, in MORAL LUCK (1981).
42. LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 93.
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dividual rights and responsibilities flow from past political decisions
about when force is justified-appears to beg the naturalist-positiv-
ist dispute about the ultimate source of individual political rights in
favor of positivism.4"
A. Fit and justification
As Dworkin examines each of these three conceptions of law, he
measures them against the general point of legal practice, that is,
according to the answers they give to the following three questions:
(1) Is the use of force justified by past political decisions? (2) If so,
why? (3) How does the justification for political coercion flow from
past decisions? Dworkin argues that a fully adequate evaluation of
any conception of law must account for an important distinction that
is recognized both by ordinary citizens and by positivist semantic
theorists such as Austin and Hart. This is the distinction between
the grounds of law or what determines what the law is, and the force of
law or whether there are good political reasons why anyone ought to
enforce or obey it. Because the development of a complete theory
of jurisprudence is a three-stage interpretive enterprise, rather than
43. For a contemporary theory of natural law jurisprudence, see J. FINNIS, NATURAL
LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980). Although Dworkin argues that moral judgment is an
integral part of interpreting the law, and thus deciding what the law is, see Dworkin,
"Natural" Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 165 (1982), his brand of liberal jurisprudence
remains recalcitrant to an essential characteristic of traditional natural law theories, i.e.,
the enterprise of deriving or defending a scheme of general political rights independent
of the history and background political theory of the particular societies in which those
rights are to have currency.
Thus, according to Dworkin, political rights are those special moral considerations
that are recognized, explicitly or implicitly, by various political communities as con-
straints on the particular background justifications they otherwise employ in the coercive
ordering of their respective societies. Hence, a theory of rights (and so the substantive
content of a community's political rights) can only be constructed and defended relative
to a particular community's background political theory. Dworkin argues, for example,
that in our own society (and contemporary liberal democracies generally) the back-
ground procedural justification for enforcing particular social choices is majoritarian,
and the background substantive justification for particular laws and policies is generally
utilitarian. Consequently, minority and individual rights are understood as legal trumps
against our society's background political theory to the extent that they insure equal
concern and respect for individuals and so preclude the unjust effects of a democratic
majority's unconstrained utilitarian preferences. Thus, since political rights are neither
timeless nor immutable, but vary in contrast to a community's background political justi-
fications, controversy about what rights we have will be attributable in part to disagree-
ments about what our background principles of social choice are and ought to be. See
LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 117, 296; R. DWoRKIN, A MAT'TER OF PRINCIPLE 359-72
(1985); R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 87 (1977); Green, The Political Content of
Legal Theory. 17 PHIL. Soc. ScI. I, 8-9 (1987); Dworkin, A Reply by R. Dworkin. in RONALD
DWORKIN AND CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE 247, 281-82, 289-92 (M. Cohen ed. 1984).
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an analytical one, it must address both of these issues. Thus, an
adequate theory of jurisprudence must show at the interpretive
stage whether and why a particular conception of law provides a
goodfit with our legal practice, and it must show at the post-inter-
pretive stage whether and how that conception of law justifies our
legal practice. Hence, the best available conception of law will ad-
dress our concern about the grounds of law with the answer it gives
to the third question, and it will address our concern about the force
of law with the answers it gives to the first and second questions.
B. Conventionalism •
According to Dworkin, conventionalism answers the first ques-
tion affirmatively.44 The use of force is justified by past political de-
cisions as provided in case precedents, statutes, rules of
construction, and principles of equity. Specifically, the convention-
alist looks to the black letter of these past political decisions as a
guide in interpreting the law understood as a set of rules agreed
upon by the political community. Coercive force is justified only to
the extent that past political decisions give fair warning to the
parties that they may expect force to be exercised in a particular
manner based on the facts of their case. The attraction of conven-
tionalism is that it justifies an exercise of force only if it comports
with the ideal of protected expectations. 45 Consequently, past polit-
ical decisions cannot yield rights and duties that are not explicit in
the black letter of the law, that is, in rules expressly sanctioned by
convention.
Dworkin argues that conventionalism is dangerous precisely be-
cause it provides no guidance in hard cases or in cases of first im-
pression. In these cases, the black letter is silent, and thus the
ultimate decision cannot flow from past political decisions inter-
preted as conventions. Consequently, the judges who decide such
cases may exercise wholly unfettered discretion. The law provides
no guidance in these cases because there is no law applicable to the
issues they raise. Because conventionalist judges deciding these
cases cannot advance the ideal of protected expectations, they can-
not violate it either. Consequently, they are free to make law in ac-
44. LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 116. Various versions of conventionalism are ad-
vanced and defended in Soper, Legal Theory and the Obligation of a Judge: The Hart/Dworkin
Dispute, 75 MICH. L. REV. 473 (1976); Lyons, Principles, Positivism, and Legal Theory, 87
YALE LJ. 415 (1977); and Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, I I J. LEGAL STUo. 139
(1982).
45. LAw's.EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 117.
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cordance with a variety of considerations, such as their political or
moral convictions, their beliefs about what a hypothetical legislature
might do under the circumstances, or their policy preferences. But
this is surely not what judges do or, in any case, ought to do. Con-
ventionalism thus fails as an interpretation of our legal practice. It
fails the test offit, because in hard cases judges attend to conven-
tional sources of-law, such as statutes or precedents, more carefully
than conventionalism permits.4 6 Judges suppose that their close
reading of the law is correct, while acknowledging that it is contro-
versial because it conflicts with other reasonable interpretations of
the law that respect the same conventions.
Moreover, conventionalism fails to justify our practice because
the decision in a hard case cannot rely on or appeal to existing con-
ventions. Of course, that decision will prospectively expand existing
legal conventions, thereby creating new or additional expectations
for future litigants in similar situations. Thus, coercion pursuant to
a future ruling that is in accord with the present one will be justified
because it will protect the newfound expectations of the future liti-
gants. On the other hand, the present decision is binding on the
parties only in the weak sense that it will be enforced. But this deci-
sion, on the conventionalist's account, must fail to justify the polit-
ical coercion that is exercised pursuant to its enforcement. Thus,
conventionalism fails because coercion in hard cases cannot be exer-
cised with political legitimacy or authority. Instead of being treated
in a principled way, the litigants become instruments for the extem-
poraneous advancement of social policy by activist judges.
Finally, Dworkin argues that conventionalism fails to justify our
practice because it is an inflexible conception of law. It requires
judges to decide a case in accord with express legal conventions
whenever these are clearly applicable. Such a conception of law will
inevitably purchase the protection of our predictive expectations at
the price of disappointing our normative expectations. Thus, some
hard cases will make bad law under conventionalism because they
will require judges to follow clearly applicable precedent even
though this results in an unjust outcome in the case at hand. We
expect justice to be done even if it occasionally requires abrogating
some black letter law to the surprise of those who have come to rely
on it. Thus, conventionalism also fails to justify our practice be-
cause it does not allow for a degree of adjudicative flexibility suffi-
cient to insure that a technical respect for precedent does not





Pragmatism, on the other hand, appears to be a more promis-
ing conception of law because it initially seems to provide the flexi-
bility missing from conventionalism. The pragmatist locates the
justification for coercion in the justice or efficiency of the immediate
political decision itself, without regard for its consistency or fit with
past legislative or judicial decisions. Pragmatism portrays judges as
deciding first how the case should be disposed so as best to promote
justice or further some moral or political ideal. Haying done this,
judges use their rhetorical skills and a selective reading of precedent
to make their decision appear the best possible fit with the past.
Thus, judges are secretly advocates who litigate in the interest
of society, as viewed through their moral and ideological
commitments.
Dworkir argues that pragmatism fails as an interpretation of
our legal practice, first, because it fails the test offit. It cannot plau-
sibly account for legal rights, which our practice recognizes as
trumps over various utilitarian policies intended to promote the in-
terests of society.48 In hard cases judges in their opinions announce
to us and to each other that they have carefully interpreted the law
in order to determine the rights of the parties. Thus, judges view
legal rights as having their source in past political decisions. Prag-
matism responds to this central concern of our legal practice by ex-
plaining it away: people are treated as if they had rights only in the
interest of furthering some social or political agenda. Talk of rights
is a subterfuge, a noble lie strategically employed to deceive the
public and purchase apparent judicial authority for the advancement
of social policy.49 Thus, pragmatism does not fit our practice be-
cause it fails to take rights seriously.5"
Second, Dworkin argues that pragmatism fails to justify our
practice. Instead, it is a skeptical conception of law that denies the
central point or purpose of our legal practice, namely, the concomi-
tant justification of political coercion and legal rights by appeal to a
47. Id. at 124-30. Dworkin is unfair to conventionalism to the extent that he inter-
marries conventionalism as a theory of scope (what the law is) with conventionalism about
how to read the law and then complains that in hard cases there is no superconvention to
resolve the conflict between black letter precedent and equity. Id.
48. Id. at 160.
49. Id. at 154-60.
50. Id. at 160-61.
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principled interpretation of our collective past political decisions.
Because it requires courts to legislate retroactively forward-looking
policies through judicial activism, pragmatism fails to constrain ad-
judication by requiring political force to be exercised consistent
with that principle which provides the best interpretation of the
legal precedents. Hence, pragmatism mistakes the strategic recon-
struction of precedent by policy for that flexible but principled
interpretation of black letter law that was missing from convention-
alism.5 1 Pragmatism escapes the dead hand of the past only to
plunge headlong into the arms of a skeptical spectre: precedent
cannot justify because it does not constrain.
Although Dworkin is confident that conventionalism and prag-
matism are both pretenders to the throne of law's empire, he re-
mains sensitive to the normative challenge pragmatism poses for
any conception of law that ties the political justification for a deci-
sion to its consistency or fit with the best interpretation of
precedent:
If ... controversial judgments are in [hard cases] inevita-
ble, the pragmatist asks, why should the controversy not be
about what really matters, about which decision will pro-
duce the . . . fewest occasions of injustice in the future?
How can that goal itself be unjust? How can consistency in
principle be important for its own sake, particularly when it
is uncertain and controversial what consistency really re-
quires? These are the questions we must answer if we wish
to sustain legal rights against the pragmatist challenge ....
[I]f we cannot sustain the importance of consistency in
principle against the charge of fetishism, we must recon-
sider the popular disdain for pragmatism as an interpreta-
51. Id. Dworkin earlier distinguished rules, principles, and policies. A policy is a
standard that defines a goal to be reached by society, and is generally directed toward
improving some social, political, or economic feature of the community (e.g., lowering
speed limits to decrease automobile accidents). Principles are standards that are ob-
served, not because they advance policy interests, but because they express the require-
ments ofjustice, fairness, or other aspects of morality (e.g., no man may profit from his
own wrong). Both principles and rules point to particular decisions, but differ essen-
tially in how they direct action. A rule is a normative formula that takes account of
exceptions and applies in a determinate, all-or-nothing fashion, according to whether
the facts stipulated in the rule obtain or not. So if two rules conflict, one of them will be
invalid. But principles direct decision not mechanically, but along the dimension of
weight, and they are not engaged by precisely formulated factual preconditions set out
in advance. The fact that principles may conflict in their application to particular cir-
cumstances requires resolution byjudgment, or a weighing of the equities, and does not
show that either principle is invalid. See R. DWORKIN, The Model of Rules i, The Model of
Rules i, and Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14, 46, 81 (1977).
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tion of our legal practice.2
V. INTERPRETING LAW AS INTEGRITY
A. The Political Virtues
Dworkin begins his answer to this challenge by distinguishing
four political virtues, which he calls fairness, justice, procedural due
process, and integrity.53  Fairness is the political virtue of proce-
dures and practices that distribute political power in a way that en-
ables all citizens to exercise approximately equal influence over the
decisionmaking bodies and institutions that govern them. Justice,
on the other hand, is the political virtue that attaches to the deci-
sions of these institutions according to whether those decisions dis-
tribute wealth and allocate rights and liberties in a morally
defensible way.54 Both of these virtues are recognized by pragma-
tism and served by policies intended to advance the concrete convic-
tions about fairness and justice that individual judges hold and
other members of the political community share. Dworkin claims
that "[oirdinary politics adds to these familiar ideals a further one
that has no distinct place in utopian axiomatic theory."' '55 This ideal
is integrity, the political virtue that treats like cases alike and "re-
quires government to speak with one voice, to act in a principled
and coherent manner toward all its citizens, to extend to everyone
the substantive standards of justice or fairness it uses for some."156
Thus, both the equal protection clause and the motto "equal justice
for all" reveal the commitment of our legal system to the virtue of
integrity.
Moreover, political integrity is analogous to personal moral in-
tegrity insofar as we want our community, as well as our associates,
not only to treat us justly, but when our conceptions of justice di-
verge, with integrity-that is, according to settled convictions rather
than caprice. Integrity is not a utopian political virtue. Instead, it
52. LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 163.
53. Id. at 164-68.
54. Id. at 73-74. Dworkin defines the virtue or concept ofjustice in this abstract and
somewhat empty fashion in order to allow for the fact that pluralistic societies, such as
ours, entertain competing conceptions ofjustice, and so that these conceptions may all be
understood to be conceptions of the same concept or virtue of justice. This is done in
order to avoid incorporating a question-begging concept ofjustice within his theory of
jurisprudence and to enable different conceptions of justice to be accommodated and
comparatively evaluated within that theory. Id. Here he follows an approach similar to
that in J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).




requires the political community to stand by its principles even if
they are flawed or fundamentally misguided from a utopian point of
view. If we can treat the political community as a moral agent, then
we can demand that it treat its citizens with integrity because we can
understand and require another person to treat us according to a
coherent, unified conception of justice, even if it is one to which we
ourselves do not subscribe.
B. Three Arguments About Integrity
This does not show, however, that integrity is a distinct political
virtue, rather than an aspect ofjustice, nor that integrity is necessary
to justify political coercion. In order to demonstrate the distinct es-
sence and necessity of integrity, Dworkin sets out a complex series
of arguments that lie at the heart of Law's Empire. If these argu-
ments cannot withstand scrutiny, then integrity will fail as a concep-
tion of law, and by his own account Dworkin will be left to
acknowledge an intractable skepticism concerning the adjudication
of hard cases and the justification of political coercion. These argu-
ments purport to show that: (1) predicating political integrity of our
community presupposes a deep and irreducible personification of that
community; (2) only its prior commitment to the political virtue of
integrity can explain our community's rejection of checkerboard laws-
laws that treat similar conduct differently on arbitrary grounds in
order to effect a political compromise; and (3) political coercion by a
community of principle-a fraternal or associative community that ac-
cepts the ideal of integrity-is justified because the members of such
a community have political obligations to one another. The first ar-
gument is advanced in order to provide the foundation for a literal
attribution of agency and responsibility to political communities-
an attribution that is implicit in the constructive interpretation of
our community's laws and social practices. The second argument is
intended to show that an interpretation of law that provides a cen-
tral role for integrity provides a better fit with our practice than do
interpretations, such as pragmatism, that only recognize justice and
fairness as political virtues. The third argument is intended to show
that interpreting the law to express integrity is necessary to justify
our practice of exercising political coercion to enforce political deci-
sions. These arguments are developed, and criticized, as follows.
1. Can Political Communities Be Personified?-First, Dworkin argues
that political communities can be committed to principles of justice,
fairness, or integrity just as a person can be committed to these
ideals. In particular, his account of integrity treats the community
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as an entity distinct from those people who are its citizens and at-
tributes moral agency and responsibility to that entity. Moreover,
Dworkin contends that a community can act according to or against
its own principles and not merely according to or against the popu-
lar morality or convictions shared by most of its members. 7
Although group personification in ordinary language is sometimes
only an elliptical way of generalizing about the attributes of its mem-
bers, Dworkin thinks that the attribution of group responsibility ex-
pressed in terms of the personification of community cannot be
reduced to a set of separate claims ascribing personal responsibility
to the individual officials and citizens of that community.
Dworkin supports this contention by drawing a familiar analogy
with the liabilities of corporations that produce defective products.
It might be that no individual employee or stockholder of the corpo-
ration acted wrongly, and so none are personally responsible for the
victim's injuries. Nevertheless, we can treat the corporation itself as
a moral agent, first by attributing fault to it, and then by proceeding
to decide how its shareholders should share in their corporation's
liability. But Dworkin insists that since we are not interested in per-
sonification and the ascription of group responsibility for its own
sake, the community, like the corporation, has no independent meta-
physical existence. This model of community personification is also
supposed to explain why it is possible and rational for contemporary
Germans to feel shame for the acts of their Nazi forebearers, with-
out doing violence to the moral precept that one is not to be blamed
for what he or she has not done.58
Corporate liability and, by analogy, community responsibility
are supposed to be nonreducible on Dworkin's account, even though
corporations and communities themselves have no mysterious, in-
dependent metaphysical existence. Yet this approach seems to
leave Dworkin on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, a good
case can be made that corporations can only act through their
agents and that corporate liability is exhausted, without residue, by
the allocation of liability among the shareholders.5 9 Of course,
there are practical reasons for treating a corporation-a complex
aggregation of parties or set of interconnected interests and roles-
as if it were a single unified legal person.' Nevertheless, even
57. Id. at 167-68.
58. Id. at 168-75.-
59. See Note, Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, 91 YALE L.J. 1641, 1652-58
(1982).
60. Id. See generally T. DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS AND MORALITY (1982) (discussing
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though judgments are rendered against corporations and not their
* shareholders, per se, no one directly suffers the subsequent loss of
* corporate assets over and above the shareholders. So a corpora-
tion's liability, at least, is reducible, even though no individual
agent, employee or shareholder of that corporation personally acted
wrongly. There is a further problem for Dworkin's analogy. Share-
holders freely assume the risk of liability when they invest in the
corporation. They purchase risk and their liability extends only so far
as their investment. But contemporary Germans are not similarly
situated. They did not act wrongly and they did not purchase the
risk of liability or shame for the acts of their forebearers. So the
justification and rationality of their shame will not be analogous to
the justification of shareholder liability.
On the other hand, assuming Dworkin's analogy can be sal-
vaged, his claim that corporate and community personality are
nonreducible will be inconsistent with his claim that personified cor-
porations and communities have no independent metaphysical
existence. Personified corporations and communities must either be
included in Dworkin's ontology, in which case they have an in-
dependent metaphysical existence, or omitted, in which case they are
reducible to "what there is"-an aggregation of related actors and
interests."' Thus, Dworkin's claim that he is only endorsing "a com-
plex, two-stage way of reasoning about ... responsibilities ... that
finds a natural expression in the personification of community "62
will not relieve the language of his account of its ontological com-
mitments6s to communities with an independent metaphysical
the moral status of corporations as juristic persons); French, The Corporation as a Moral
Person, 3 AM. PHIL. 0. 207 (1979); Goodpaster, Morality and Organizations, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE SECOND NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BuSINESs ETmics (M. Hoffman ed.
1977).
61. See W. QUINE, On What There Is, in FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 1-19 (2d ed.
1961).
62. LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 168-69.
63. Ontological questions are concerned with what are the most basic categories of
entities that actually exist (e.g., physical objects, numbers, classes, sensations, universals,
particulars, relations) and the extent to which other, ontologically fictitious entities can
be reduced or explained away in terms of the basic entities without residue. Thus, the
question of whether and in what sense Dworkin's personified communities exist indepen-
dently of the individual citizens that make up their membership is an ontological ques-
tion. It may be argued that abstract entities, such as personified communities, exist but
in a different sense of the word "exist" from that in which their members are said to
exist. But whether the word "exist" is genuinely equivocal in this fashion is open to
question.
Quine and others have argued persuasively that the theories we embrace-indeed
the ordinary assertions we make about our world--carry with them ontological commit-




2. Does Integrity Explain Our Practice?-Dworkin's second argu-
ment sets out to show that integrity is a distinct political virtue of
our community that provides a better fit with our legal practice than
any conception of law that rejects it. In order to show this and to
provide a test case for our political intuitions about fit, Dworkin in-
troduces the notion of checkerboard laws. These are laws that treat
citizens and substantially similar conduct differently on completely
arbitrary grounds in order to effect a political compromise. An ex-
ample of a checkerboard law would be a statute or court decision
that allocated and limited abortion rights in proportion to the distri-
bution in the political community of those citizens who favored or
opposed these rights. Such a statute might confer the right only on
women who conceive in even calendar years or who conceive during
even years of their age. Dworkin observes that we severally and as a
community reject laws that recognize such arbitrary distinctions
when matters of principle are in issue. Instead, each interest or
member of a constituency given a voice in political deliberation
must be ready to partake in a collective decision to settle on one
coherent principle rather than a patchwork rule. And even when
citizens have divergent conceptions of justice, compromise within a
community that accepts integrity occurs external to various coherent
schemes of justice and is concerned with which scheme should be
adopted. This contrasts with internal political compromise that is
worked out within a scheme ofjustice and results in a compromised
conception of justice.
Dworkin argues that we cannot account for our rejection of
checkerboard laws by appealing to the political virtues of justice or
fairness.' He contends, for instance, that checkerboard solutions
posits certain types of entities) insofar as the truth of the theory presupposes the exist-
ence of the entities found in that ontology. Thus, Dworkin cannot have his theory of
personified communities without the ontological commitments of its language. This is
because
we... have a[n] ... explicit standard whereby to decide what ontology a given
theory or form of discourse is committed to: a theory is committed to those
and only those entities to which the bound variables of the theory must be
capable of referring in order that the affirmations made in the theory be true.
W. QUINE, supra note 61, at 13-14. For a criticism of Quine's view, see Church, Ontologi-
cal Commitment, 55 J. PHIL. 1008 (1958).
64. LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 179. Dworkin states:
[C]heckerboard laws are by hypothesis fairer than either of the two alternatives.
Allowing each of two groups to choose some part of the law of abortion, in
proportion to their numbers, is fairer (in our sense) than the winner-take-all
1988]
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are not by definition unjust since they will eliminate some injustice in
many political circumstances in which enforcing exceptionless com-
pliance with a majority rule would increase justice. Thus, in ordi-
nary politics, "checkerboard strategies will prevent instances of
injustice that would otherwise occur, and we cannot say that justice
requires not eliminating any injustice unless we can eliminate all." 65
Nevertheless, Dworkin's argument is unfair to justice. One can
equally maintain that checkerboard solutions by definition are not
just, because checkerboard strategies will create some instances of
injustice that otherwise would not occur and would, even in ordi-
nary politics, be avoidable. Moreover, our shared, abstract concept of
justice requires at least that an individual's conduct or a commu-
nity's laws treat members of a class equally, when this is possible,
regardless of which particular conception or theory of justice we en-
dorse. This explains, perhaps, why it is rational for some egalitarian
members of a group to complain that their entitlements to certain
benefits, arbitrarily or accidentally denied to other members, are un-
just because those entitlements could have been but were not ex-
tended to the others. If this understanding is right, then the ideal
that Dworkin calls integrity may not be a distinct political virtue at
all, but only an aspect of the concept of justice-albeit one that may
conflict with our inclination to achieve a better or less onerous out-
come by compromising our prevailing conception of justice in order
to reach a decision required by a different and arguably better con-
ception of justice.
Unmoved by explanations that rely on other political ideals,
Dworkin is drawn to hypothesize the existence of a political ideal
that we accept and that allows us to criticize the internal com-
promises characterizing checkerboard laws as instances of unprinci-
pled state action:
Astronomers postulated Neptune before they discovered it.
They knew that only another planet, whose orbit lay be-
yond those already recognized, could explain the behavior
of the nearer planets. Our instincts about internal compro-
mise suggest another political ideal standing beside justice
and fairness. Integrity is our Neptune. The most natural
explanation of why we oppose checkerboard statutes ap-
peals to that ideal: we say that a state that adopts these
scheme our instincts prefer, which denies many people any influence at all over
an issue they think desperately important.
Id
65. d. at 181.
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internal compromises is acting in an unprincipled way
66
This criticism, Dworkin argues, has force for us even when these
compromises deliver half a loaf of justice where otherwise there
would be none, and even when no citizen or official who votes for or
enforces these compromises does anything individually that violates
ordinary standards of personal morality.
Integrity is the virtue hypothesized as necessary to explain our
rejection of checkerboard laws. Thus, a political community that ac-
cepts integrity is closer to our practice because it will reject laws
produced by internal compromise, laws that requirethe community
to
endorse principles to justify part of what it has done that it
must reject to justify the rest. That explanation distin-
guishes integrity from the perverse consistency of someone
who refuses to rescue some prisoners because he cannot
save all. If he had saved some, selected arbitrarily, he
would not have violated any principle he needs to justify
other acts. But a state does act that way when it accepts a
Solomonic checkerboard solution; it is inconsistency in
principle among the acts of the state personified that integ-
rity condemns. 6
For this reason, Dworkin contends that the interpretation of law as
integrity-an interpretation that places integrity alongside justice
and fairness-will provide a closerfit with our legal practice than an
interpretation that treats a community's public order as a commod-
ity to be pared and distributed according to the relative strength of
those divergent conceptions of justice prevalent within the
community.
3. Does Integrity Justify Our Practice?-Dworkin argues that we
can also justify our legal practice by accepting and deferring to the
political virtue of integrity in our practice of law.68 There are two
major consequences of integrity that make its acceptance attractive
to a political community.
66. Id. at 183.
67. Id. at 184.
68. Id. at 176. In particular, Dworkin distinguishes two principles of integrity which
government officials and citizens are to promote in making our practice the best it can
be. The first principle is that of legislative integrity, which requires lawmakers to create
or revise laws so that the total set of our laws are "morally coherent" so far as possible.
The second principle is that of adjudicative integrity, which requires that the law be seen
or interpreted to be coherent in principle so far as possible. Id.
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a. The Ideal of Self-Government.-First, for the political commu-
nity personified and for its members individually, integrity has a
moral or expressive value that promotes the ideals of freedom and
autonomous self-government extolled in the works of Kant 69 and
Rousseau. ° These ideals are promoted by integrity because ra-
tional people cannot, to the extent they are rational, commit them-
selves to moral rules that are inconsistent in principle. By analogy, a
community personified cannot view itself as the author of laws that
are willfully inconsistent in principle yet devised for the purpose of
governing itself.
In support of this claim, Dworkin argues that if we understood
the laws of society only as negotiated solutions to well-defined
problems-merely as workable internal compromises between mu-
tually hostile or indifferent interests-then we would distinguish
sharply among relationships with our fellow citizens accordingly as
the relationships were regulated by such compromises. In the ab-
sence of such political compromises, when the legal rules are silent,
no shared political ideals or standards would be recognized as mak-
ing a special claim on the way citizens treat one another. Thus,
without the political ideal of integrity, citizens would not be re-
quired to acknowledge collectively that principles of a shared public
conception of justice underlie the explicit political decisions of the
community and have the force of moral demands on them. But to
the extent that a community adopts the political ideal of integrity,
then its citizens treat the political demands placed on them on the
model of moral demands that individuals recognize as binding on
themselves: an individual's desire for freedom and moral auton-
omy-that is, the capacity for rational but altruistic self-govern-
ment-requires the reconciliation of conflicting private moral
principles and convictions.
Because individual moral autonomy is thus promoted by this
reconciliation (or equilibrium) of conflicting moral principles and
judgments,7 the political autonomy of a community-that is, its ca-
69. See I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (H. J. Paton trans.
1978) (1785).
70. See J. ROUSSEAU, supra note 2.
71. Rawls uses the term "reflective equilibrium" to refer to the rational process of
the mutual adjustment of our moral principles and our considered moral judgments.
This ongoing dialectical process involves, alternatively, revising or qualifying our gen-
eral moral principles (to avoid some otherwise unacceptable particular moral judgments
they would entail) and withdrawing those of our untutored and more peripheral moral
judgments that we regard with less conviction (in order to bring our judgments collec-
tively into greater conformity with principle). This back-and-forth process results in
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pacity for collective self-government, as distinguished from the ability of
factions within the society to reach unprincipled compromises of
convenience-is similarly promoted when its citizens develop a co-
herent public conception of justice. Thus, the ideal of self-govern-
ment is directly promoted by the political virtue of integrity insofar
as it motivates the development and application of shared rather
than compromised standards of public law within the community.
Hence, commitment to integrity fuses citizens' moral and political
lives by requiring citizens with conflicting interests to resolve their
conflicts by appealing exclusively to those principles of law recog-
nized by the political community. Integrity does not permit citizens
of a community to trade off their special interests, one against the
other, merely in order to neutralize conflict. Rather, it is a positive
political ideal: it demands that the members of a community treat
each other equally by subordinating their special or factional inter-
ests to the interests and concerns they share by virtue of their mem-
bership in the same community. 2
cognitive equilibrium to the extent that it minimizes or eliminates conflicts between par-
ticular moral intuitions and the formal moral theory that systemizes those intuitions.
And this process is reflective insofar as it reveals those principles to which our judg-
ments conform and the premises of their derivation. See J. RAWLS, supra note 54, at 20-
2 1. Dworkin borrows the term from Rawls to express the aim of the constructive inter-
pretation of a social practice (or body of law) as the achievement of equilibrium between
the justification of the practice and its post-interpretive requirements. LAw's EMPIRE,
supra note 6, at 424 n. 17.
72. LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 189-90. Alisdair Macintyre offers a less optimistic
picture of law's capacity to give form and expression to a public morality:
Liberal writers such as Ronald Dworkin invite us to see the Supreme Court's
function as that of invoking a set of consistent principles ... of moral import, in
the light of which particular laws and . . . decisions are to be evaluated .... But
... one function of the Supreme Court must be to keep the peace between rival
social groups adhering to... incompatible principles ofjustice by displaying a
fairness which consists in even-handedness in its adjudications. So the
Supreme Court in Bakke both forbade precise ethnic quotas for admission to
colleges and universities, but allowed discrimination in favour of previously de-
prived minority groups. [Attempts to construct] a set of consistent principles
behind such a decision... miss the point. The [Court]. . . played the role of a
... truce-keeping body by negotiating its way through an impasse of conflict,
not by invoking our shared moral first principles. For our society as a whole
has none.
What this brings out is that modern politics cannot be a matter of genuine moral
consensus .... Modern politics is civil war carried on by other means, and Bakke was an
engagement whose antecedents were at Gettysburg and Shiloh. The truth on
this matter was set out by Adam Ferguson: "We are not to expect that the laws
. ..are to be framed as so many lessons of morality .... Laws . . .are ex-
pedients of policy to adjust the pretensions of parties and to secure the peace
of society .... The nature of any society therefore is not to be deciphered
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b. Fraternal Duties and Political Legitimacy.-Second, integrity has
a practical consequence that justifies our legal practice. It legiti-
mizes state coercion that advances those moral and political princi-
ples that inhere in and flow from the community's past political
decisions-even though this coercion may be exercised pursuant to
a controversial political decision that not only offends the concep-
tion of justice of those coerced but that of a majority as well. This
justification for political coercion presupposes the existence of polit-
ical obligations owed by citizens to other members of the commu-
nity and to the community itself by virtue of their citizenship.
Dworkin is careful to add, however:
These two issues-whether the state is morally legitimate,
in the sense that it is justified in using force against its citi-
zens, and whether the state's decisions impose genuine ob-
ligations on them-are not identical. No state should
enforce all of a citizen's obligations. But though obligation
is not a sufficient condition for coercion, it is close to a nec-
essary one... [because] no general policy of upholding the
law with steel could be justified if the law were not, in gen-
eral, a source of genuine obligations.73
What is the source of a citizen's political obligations, obligations
necessary to legitimize coercion? Dworkin quickly dismisses theo-
ries that appeal to tacit consent,74 the duty to be just, 5 or the duty
from its laws alone, but from those understood as an index of its conflicts.
What our laws show is the extent and degree to which conflict has to be suppressed.
A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 235-36 (1981) (quoting A. FERGUSON, 2 PRINCIPLES OF
MORAL AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 145 (1792) (emphasis added)).
73. LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 191.
74. Id. at 192. Dworkin's views on this theory recall his earlier criticism of Rawls'
hypothetical social contract. Dworkin argues that the legitimacy of political coercion
within an actual community cannot depend on whether that community coincidentally
adopts those principles ofjustice that would be agreed upon by rational, self-interested
persons bound to legislate the fundamental social arrangements of their society from a
position of uncertainty behind an ahistorical and impersonal "veil of ignorance."
Although this idea of a hypothetical social contract may define the proper conditions for
social choice that would result in substantive, morally defensible principles of justice, it
cannot fairly legitimize the use of force to impose those principles on persons not party
to the contract. This is because "hypothetical contracts do not supply an independent
argument for the fairness of enforcing their terms. A hypothetical contract is not simply
a pale form of an actual contract; it is no contract at all." R. DWORKIN,JUSIice and Rights,
in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 151 (1977).
Dworkin is correct that theories of legitimacy grounded in the actual or tacit con-
sent of the governed are implausible. There has never been an actual historical agree-
ment among citizens to accept and obey the political decisions of their community. And
tacit consent sufficient to bind the governed cannot be inferred unless there are genuine
alternatives for those to whom it is imputed; such consent cannot be given with the
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of fair play. 76 These theories reveal what are at most necessary con-
ditions for political obligation, and thus coercive legitimacy, within a
particular, existing political community.
Dworkin instead develops the theory that political legitimacy is
grounded in the obligations we willingly acknowledge and accept as
members of a fraternal or associative political community. This
idea, which relies on an extended analogy to the communal duties
and obligations we accept toward family members, did not originate
with Dworkin. Indeed, it is very old and appears to have been enter-
tained first by Socrates in the Crito. 77 Apparently unaware of its ori-
requisite degree of freedom when immigration is unfeasible for most 'itizens and would
only subject them to the laws of another sovereign. Lw's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 192-
93.
However, Dworkin's earlier argument against grounding political legitimacy on hy-
pothetical consent is less convincing. Since liberalism fundamentally requires that a social
order be one that can bejustified to the people who live within it, then it must be possible
to understand the legitimate enforcement of that order as being conditioned on the con-
sent of those individuals. Thus, a necessary test, at least for the political legitimacy of a
social order, "is not whether the individuals who live in it have agreed to its terms, but
whether its terms can be represented as the object of an agreement between them." Wal-
dron, Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism, 37 PHIL. Q. 127, 142 (1987).
75. LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 193.
76. Id. at 193-95. Dworkin argues that the fact someone
has actually received what is due him according to the standards of justice and
fairness [that accrue as benefits of a particular social organization] ... states at
least a condition necessary to legitimacy. If a community does not aim to treat
someone as an equal, even according to its own lights, then its claim to his
political obligation is fatally compromised. But it remains unclear how the neg-
ative fact that society has not discriminated against someone ... according to
its own standards, could supply any positive reason why he should accept its
laws as obligations.
Id. at 195.
77. In the Crito, at 50d to 51c, Socrates, speaking for the laws, queries:
[C]ome now, what charge do you bring against us and the state, that you are
trying to destroy us? Did we not give you life in the first place? Was it not
through us that your father married your mother and begot you? Tell us, have
you any complaint against those of us laws that deal with marriage.. . (or] with
children's upbringing and [cultural and physical] education such as you had
yourself? ... Very good. Then . . . can you deny... that you were our child and
servant, both you and your ancestors? And if this is so, do you imagine that
what is right for us is equally right for you, and that whatever we try to do to
you, you are justified in retaliating? . . . Do you expect to have such license
against your country and its laws... ? ... [1n the law courts and everywhere
else you must do whatever your city and your country command, or else per-
suade them in accordance with universal justice, but violence is a sin ... against
your parents, and it is a far greater sin against your country.
PLATO, Crito, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES Or PLATo 35-36 (E. Hamilton & H. Cairn
eds. 1961) (emphasis added). For critical discussions of Socrates' theory, see R. KRAUT,
SOCRATES AND THE STATE (1984); Woozley, Socrates on Disobeying the Law, in THE PHILOSO-
PHY OF SOCRATES: A COLLECTION OF CRITICAL EssAYs 299 (G. Vlastos ed. 197 1). For a
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gins, Dworkin nevertheless admirably elaborates this idea, showing
how the fraternal duty metaphor for political obligation can be
given expression in an explicit and detailed analogy between the fa-
milial duties of family members and the legal obligations that citi-
zens owe one another and the political community generally. The
outline of Dworkin's labyrinthine argument is as follows.
First, the legitimacy of state coercion must be shown to be
grounded in genuine political obligations to other citizens to obey
the law. Such obligations are justified by showing the legitimacy of
the kind of community in which they exist.
Second, these obligations exist in associative or fraternal com-
munities, of which the family is a paradigm. Such communities have
four defining features: (1) their members regard group obligations
as special obligations among members of the group only, and not as
duties owed to other persons generally; (2) they regard these duties
as personal in that they are owed directly from each member to each
other member of the group, rather than to the group collectively;
(3) each member regards his or her particular duties as flowing from
a general responsibility each has of concern for the well-being of
others in the group; and (4) the group's practices show an equal con-
cern for all its members, so that even hierarchies within the group
are egalitarian in that, unlike a caste system, they do not treat some
members as inherently less worthy of concern. 78 There are, more-
over, three models of community. These are communities of cir-
cumstance; rulebook communities that trade checkerboard laws for
a coherent conception of the public order; and communities of prin-
ciple that are committed to integrity.79
Third, only communities of principle can be true associative or
theory that views political obligations among citizens as a special class of the shared,
associational duties of friendship, see ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean Ethics (Books VIII and IX),
in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (R. McKeon ed. 1941). Socrates and Aristotle, like
Dworkin, are intent on understanding, and thereby justifying, political obligation as a
species of the more familiar interpersonal associative duties that we already recognize as
making valid claims on our obedience, loyalty, and concern.
The Socratic account of political obligation is modeled on the filial duties of obedi-
ence that children owe their parents, rather than the fraternal duties of mutual concern
that arise between siblings. But too much can be made of this distinction; both duties
are species of a more general familial associative duty that we view with relatively less
suspicion than political obligations generally. Moreover, Dworkin's "fraternal duty" is a
term of art: fraternal duties must meet four special criteria, and Dworkin uses the term
broadly to characterize not only the duties of siblings but also the duties that children
owe their parents. See LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 203-05.
78. LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 195-202.
79. Id. at 208-15.
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fraternal communities, because only communities of principle ex-
hibit the pervasive egalitarian reciprocity that characterizes the four
conditions defining fraternal communities. They do this by eschew-
ing. checkerboard laws and treating their members in a principled
fashion. Thus, every community of principle accepts the political
virtue of integrity.
Fourth, we accept without further justification that in fraternal
communities, such as the family or a professional association, mem-
bers recognize and have genuine obligations and duties to one an-
other even though their membership in those communities may be
involuntary. 0
Fifth, a political community that eschews the internal compro-
mise of checkerboard laws and is instead a community of principle
will be a true associative or fraternal community. Its members will
therefore have genuine political duties and obligations, expressed in
law, to one another and thus to the community. The existence of
these political obligations in turn justifies or legitimizes that com-
munity's exercise of political coercion pursuant to their enforce-
ment. Thus, in a community of principle-one that accepts
integrity-political coercion is legitimized because that community
is fraternal, and hence yields obligations its members recognize as
legitimate.
Finally, our political community accepts integrity as a virtue be-
cause it eschews checkerboard laws in favor of a principled, egalita-
rian public order. Therefore, our political community's
interpretation of law as integrity legitimizes coercion exercised pur-
suant to political decisions that flow from those principles providing
the best interpretation of past political acts.
The attraction of Dworkin's justification for political coercion
pursuant to our existing scheme of law, insofar as it accepts integ-
rity, stems from its grounding coercion on our existing, if some-
times controversial, political obligations. These in turn are a special
class of those fraternal obligations that we accept as arising inciden-
tal to our roles as members of a family or, more generally, an as-
sociative community. Thus, the crucial move in the argument
occurs in the fourth step, a move in which Dworkin shifts the burden
of proof to his critics. Because he does not believe that the grounds
for political obligation are or need be any firmer than our existing
commitments to various other forms of fraternal or associative soli-
darity, Dworkin is content to let the legitimacy of political coercion
80. Id. at 207.
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rest on the same terrafirma as other kinds of fraternal or associative
coercion that we accept as legitimate. He remarks that
[one] complaint about this "solution" of the problem of le-
gitimacy [is that] "it does not solve the problem but evades
it by denying there is a problem at all." There is some jus-
tice in this complaint, but not enough to be damaging here.
The new approach, it is true, relocates the problem of legit-
imacy and so hopes to change the character of the argu-
ment. It asks those who challenge the very possibility of
political legitimacy to broaden their attack and either deny
all associative obligations or show why political obligation
cannot be associative. t
This burden is fairly placed. If his critics 8 2 cannot meet it, then
Dworkin will have shown that the legitimacy of political coercion is
practically grounded in existing obligations that we implicitly accept
as members of a fraternal community.
If citizens of political communities recognize and accept their
obligations to other citizens of the community, why, assuming they
do not succumb to moral "weakness of will" and assuming they act
in good faith, is political coercion necessary at all? How might a
citizen's arguably justified civil disobedience be explained in a way
that preserves the citizen's moral sincerity and character as a just
person, while recognizing the general legitimacy of state coercion
intended either to punish or to force compliance with the law?8"
Dworkin's argument seems to suggest that legitimate coercion ends
where citizens do not recognize or feel a sense of obligation to the
other members of the community to obey the law. But, by his ac-
count, communal feelings of obligation are only evidence for citi-
zens that they accept and have political obligations. These
obligations are given content and expression in terms of principles
that the community accepts and that will, in turn, entail more spe-
cific commitments to the community of which the citizen may be un-
aware. Thus, many political obligations may exist for a member of
81. Id.
82. For example, Hutchinson criticizes Dworkin's account of fraternal community on
the theory that associative arrangements that are contingent on reciprocity mask oppres-
sive power relations as traditional fraternal and filial duties. See Indiana Dworkin, supra
note 15, at 653-56. The nature, scope, and legitimacy of filial duties are by no means
uncontroversial. For recent discussions, see J. BLUSTEIN, PARENTS AND CHILDREN: THE
ETHICS OF THE FAMILY (1982) and Sommers, Filial Morality, 83J. PHIL. 439 (1986).
83. For detailed treatment of this and related issues, seeJ. RAWLS, supra note 54: R.




the community, whether or not that individual feels any correspond-
ing sense of obligation. This is what justifies coercion in those cases
in which members of the community do not sense or are unaware of
a political obligation to act.
c. The Problem of Political Authority.--One problem remains for
Dworkin's account of fraternal obligation and political legitimacy
that does not impair the Socratic model. In the Crito, Socrates ar-
gued that he ought to obey the laws of his country because he owed
them the same kind of filial regard that he owed to his parents.84
Because Socrates did not distinguish the state, or the community
personified, from its laws,"5 he was in effect arguing that he owed
the community personified a filial duty of obedience. Thus, by Soc-
raies' account, the filial duty to obey the law is one that we owe
directly to the state. If this is correct, it explains fundamentally why
the state is justified in coercing our compliance with its laws. First,
there is a pre-existing duty that citizens recognize to respect and
obey the law. Second, and more to the point, political coercion is
exercised, in the Socratic model, by the person to whom the duty is
owed-the state. Thus, the state is recognized as having the exclu-
sive authority to require its citizens to comply with those duties they
owe it. This is not the case for third parties to whom the duty is not
owed, and who have no other legal interest in its enforcement. We
do not recognize them as having the authority or standing to coerce
compliance with duties owed exclusively to another. This analogy
further explains why we take exception when others discipline our
children without our authorization, and it explains why vigilantes
and other private "enforcers" not authorized by the state are
reproached for taking the law into their own hands--even when the
same result would have obtained had the state exercised its coercive
powers. This suggests that there are at least two conditions neces-
sary to justify or legitimize political coercion: (1) the coerced citizen
must have a duty to act in the way he or she is being forced to act;8 6
and (2) this duty must in some sense be owed to the political entity
responsible for exercising the coercion.
Dworkin's account, like Socrates', personifies the political com-
munity and treats political obligations as associative duties that are
sufficient to legitimize the state's exercise of political coercion. But
84. Woozley, supra note 77, at 312-13.
85. Id.
86. Dworkin agrees that political obligation is a necessary but insufficient condition
for legitimate coercion. See LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 191.
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there is a crucial difference: the duties recognized by members of a
fraternal or associative community are essentially personal in that
they are owed directly to other members of the community. Because
associative obligations are recognized, one important necessary
condition for legitimate political coercion has been satisfied. More-
over, other members of a fraternal community, to whom a particular
member owes duties, would be morally justified in singly or collec-
tively using reasonable coercion to require that person to comply
with those recognized duties. That is, the member recognizes that
these other members, if anyone, would have the moral authority to
use reasonable coercion. This would not amount to a vigilante's
usurpation of the law unless those members of the community had
previously entrusted or assigned their coercive authority to a state
or political community that could legitimately exercise such coer-
cion on their behalf.
But none of these considerations are sufficient to show that
Dworkin's fraternal community is itse/fjustified in exercising political
coercion to force a member to comply with his or her fraternal du-
ties. This is because those duties, insofar as they are personal, as
Dworkin requires, are owed to another member of the community
and not to the community personified itself. Thus, since Dworkin's
fraternal political community lacks authority to use force in this way,
it cannot satisfy the second condition necessary for the legitimate
exercise of political coercion."7
87. Sheldon Wolin's remarks on the concept of political legitimacy and its role in
pluralist democracies are particularly germane. He observes:
Legitimacy is a complex notion. Minimally, it means that one is legally author-
ized or entitled to perform some act. But in a political context legitimacy ac-
quires an added element, a certain aura which earlier centuries sometimes
called dignitas or majestas, but which in modern, more democratic times comes
from the ... belief that the authority of law is derived from the supreme author-
ity in a human society, the sovereign body of the people .... In a society whose
political identity is . . . importantly linked with free and popular elections, the
exalted status of law is usually attributed to the fact that legislation is primarily
the creation of a legislature elected by the people. An undertaking that is legiti-
mated is one that has been established or confirmed by public authority and
hence, in a political sense, has been declared "right," that is, the power that the
actor or agency will exercise is beneficial to the public good ....
Pluralism presents a problem for a theory of legitimacy because its implicit
presupposition is that no such collective entity or actor as "the people" exists.
Society is composed of a variety of different interest[s] and social classes. Plu-
ralism is thus the dissolvent of the idea of the people and hence of any claim
that "the people" can act or will. But if that is the case, we are the possessors
of a form of politics that has no theory of legitimacy to accompany it and to
clothe its results in "right."
Wolin, The American Pluralist Conception of Politics, in EmIcs IN HARD TiMEs 217, 225-26
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One apparent solution to this difficulty might provide that the
state or community personified is democratically licensed by a ma-
jority of citizens or members to serve as a limited agent for those
individual members whose fraternal "rights" are violated. Suppose,
for instance, that a majority enacts a statute that requires and obli-
gates a member to confer benefits on certain members comprising a
minority of the community. The fraternal duty to comply with that
law will be one that the member owes only to those entitled to the
benefits. The majority-those not entitled to the benefits-will not
have standing to enforce the law. But enforcement by the state will
still be legitimate on this theory because the minority entitled to
those benefits will have entrusted or assigned their enforcement au-
thority to a community that has been democratically licensed to ex-
ercise that authority on their behalf.
But this democratic agency theory cannot explain and is actu-
ally vitiated by the central feature of our practice of recognizing
political rights. That is, our constitutional practice requires the state
to respect the fundamental individual rights of its citizens even
when doing so runs contrary to the settled will and interests of the
majority. Such an exercise of power must be ultra vires according to
pure democratic theory, because the justification for the exercise of
political force is rooted in the source of power-the will of the major-
ity. Thus, purely democratic political force is necessarily compro-
mised or abused if it is employed in the recognition of individual
rights in a way that intentionally thwarts the will of the majority. An
appeal to the political virtue of integrity or to the community's con-
ception of justice cannot circumvent this problem because the pur-
pose of democratic machinery-which follows from the theoretical
justification for democratic political power-is to express faithfully
the will of a majoriiy and not the principles of a community
personified.
Since the courts are state institutions that are not democrati-
cally accountable,"8 but are nonetheless charged with enforcing in-
(A. Caplan & D. Callahan eds. 1981) (emphasis added). Wolin's article provides an ex-
cellent historical account of the developinent of the ideas of pluralism and tolerance
within liberal democratic theory and the difficulties they pose for the contemporary le-
gitimation of political coercion.
88. For a discussion of the considerable constitutional and practical problems associ-
ated with efforts to legitimize court actions through substantial legislative, and thus
democratic, limitations on judicial review, see Reynolds, Book Review, 44 MD. L. REV.
204, 211-13 (1985) (reviewing M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS (1982)).
Throughout the above discussion of political legitimacy, democratic control is un-
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dividuals' political rights, their exercise of power intentionally
contrary to the will of the majority cannot be understood as action
taken by an agent of that will. So, one cannot coherently view the
courts, and hence the state, as being democratically licensed or per-
mitted to trump the will of the majority. Therefore, the community
personified is not democratically licensed to permit minorities to
delegate to it their authority to enforce their rights when those
rights conflict with the will of the majority.
If this is right, then democratic agency theory cannot provide
the political authority that is missing from Dworkin's account and
that is necessary to bridge the gap between personal fraternal polit-
ical obligations and legitimate state coercion. This political gap be-
tween associative duty and the coercive authority of the community
is not surprising. It results from Dworkin's failure to explain how
the interpersonal duties that members of a fraternal community owe
one another can entail the existence of irreducible second-order du-
ties-that is, distinct duties to comply with their first-order, inter-
personal fraternal duties-that these members owe to the
community personified. Dworkin must do this if he is to provide a
complete and convincing account of political legitimacy--one that
authorizes state coercion for the antimajoritarian vindication of indi-
vidual political rights. Without such an account, his theory of polit-
ical rights and political legitimacy will remain "nonsense on stilts."
VI. APPLICATIONS OF LAW AS INTEGRITY
A. Common-Law Adjudication
In the remaining chapters of Law's Empire, Dworkin explores the
implications of his interpretation of law as integrity. First, he pro-
vocatively portrays the entire common-law adjudicative tradition as
an essentially interpretive enterprise89 wherein judges, by successive
interpretations of an expanding body of case law, engage in writing
an historical "chain novel" of the law. To make this story of law the
derstood in purely procedural terms as electoral accountability. That is, the exercise of
pure democratic governmental decisionmaking can occur apart from prior substantive
constraints on the content of the policies or outcomes produced "such as substantive
equality, respect for human rights, concern for the general welfare, personal liberty or
the rule of law." Barry, Is Democraty Special?, in PHILOSOPHY, PoLrncs AND SOCIETY
(FIFTH SERIES) 155, 156 (P. Laslett &J. Fishkin eds. 1979). See also M. PERRY, THE CON-
STIrUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3-4 (1982); W. NELSON, ON JUSTIFYING DE-
MOCRAcY 3 (1980).
89. LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 226. Dworkin writes that
Law as integrity is . . . more relentlessly interpretive than either conven-
tionalism or pragmatism. These latter theories offer themselves as interpreta-
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best it can be, later generations of authors labor to continue the
story in a constructive way that minimizes inconsistency in principle
with the earlier chapters, while making a positive contribution that
best justifies our practice as a whole. To the extent they succeed,
the chain of law can be understood as the coherent expression of an
evolving conception of justice by a single author, the community
personified.9" This requires that adjudicative integrity be more flex-
ible than the formalistic rule-bound consistency that characterizes
conventionalism.9 Yet the constraint it places on adjudication is
both non-strategic and of a stronger variety than legislative integ-
rity; legislation invites judgments of policy that the adjudication of
rights, even in hard cases, does not.92 To illustrate both the adjudi-
cative constraints and the constructive pull of integrity in law, Dwor-
kin develops a detailed account of how Hercules, an archetypal and
omniscient judge, might labor to interpret the common law of emo-
tional damages when presented with a hard case. 93
Dworkin also discusses difficulties endemic to the economic
analysis of accident law and to utilitarian and libertarian interpreta-
tions .... But the programs they recommend are not themselves programs of.
interpretation ....
Law as integrity is different: it is both the product of and the inspiration
for comprehensive interpretation of legal practice. The program it holds out to
judges deciding hard cases is essentially, not just contingently, interpretive; law
as integrity asks them to continue interpreting the same material that it claims
to have successfully interpreted itself. It offers itself as continuous with-the
initial part of-the more detailed interpretations it recommends.
Id. at 226-27 (emphasis in original).
90. Id. at 228-38.
91. Id. at 219-24. Dworkin argues that adjudicative integrity is more flexible than
(and hence distinct from) mere consistency, because its requirements are sometimes
broader and sometimes narrower than those of consistency. It is broader because an
institution that is committed to expressing a single coherent scheme ofjustice and fair-
ness in the right relation may for that reason depart from a narrow line of precedents in
its search for a decision that better exhibits fidelity to principles that are more funda-
mental to the scheme as a whole. But integrity is narrower than consistency, because its
domain is principle; it does not require the community to act consistently in matters of
policy. So legislatures may decide to extend a benefit to a particular group that it denies
to others, not because the community's conception ofjustice affords that group a right
to the benefit, but only because extending the benefit in that way benefits the community
as a whole. Id. But see J. RAwLs, supra note 54, at 152-61 (The conception of justice as
fairness entails the maximin principle, which requires as a matter of justice that society
institute a distributive scheme that results in a disparity of rights to goods or benefits
among its members if any other less disparate distribution would reduce the total goods
available for distribution so that the least well off member of the community would be
left relatively worse off than he would be under the more disparate distributive scheme.).
92. Law's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 410.
93. Id. at 238-50.
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tions of the common law.94 He rejects wealth maximization, argu-
ing that interpretations of the common law appealing to this ideal
fail the test of justification, if not fit, because the goal of increasing
societal wealth is not the polestar of our principles of personal and
political morality. 9 5 In its place, he develops a difficult and complex
egalitarian or "equality of resources" interpretation of accident law
and private responsibility.
Dworkin contends that even in hard cases, where the common
law is unclear and the precedents are split, adjudicative integrity re-
quires a judge to formulate and adopt a principle which provides the
best fit with and justification for the precedents-those cases whose
holdings appear, at the pre-interpretive stage, to be arguably dis-
positive of the issue in question. Hence, the optimal principle of law
is one that best explains and best justifies most of the precedents.
Those remaining cases that cannot be consistently assimilated under
the principle are viewed as mistakes. Hence, common-law adjudica-
tion requires, as Lord Mansfield said, that "law ... not consistent in
particular cases; but in general principles, which run through the
cases, and govern the decision of them."96 Because adjudicative in-
tegrity aims to treat litigants in a principled way, the common law is,
on Dworkin's account, self-correcting. That is, common-law adjudi-
cation draws the development of the law, over time, in the direction
of greater coherence and consistency in principle. It is in this sense
that "the common law ... works itself pure so that if errors creep into
it, upon reasons which more enlarged views and a higher state of
enlightenment ... prove to be fallacious, they may be worked out by
subsequent decisions."9 7
However, in hard cases, two competing principles will fit the
majority of the precedents equally well, and better than any other
contenders. These principles may possibly be coextensive in their
application to the precedents. That is, they may fit exactly the same
precedents, differing in their result only in the case at hand. More
likely, the two principles will not be coextensive but will still account
94. Id. at 276-95. For a libertarian critique of Dworkin's views, see Macedo, The Pub-
lic Morality of the Rule of Law: A Critique of Ronald Dworkin, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 79
(1985).
95. LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 285-95. For an extended discussion of Dworkin's
views on several hard cases, common-law adjudication, and the economic and egalitarian
interpretations of tort law, see Wasserstrom, The Empire's New Clothes, 75 GEO. L.J. 199
(1986). For Dworkin's previous criticisms of the economic analysis of law, see R. DWOR-
KIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 237-89 (1985).
96. Rust v. Cooper, 2 Cowp. 629, 632 (1777).
97. Shaw v. Moore, 49 N.C. 25, 27 (1856). See L.Aw's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 400.
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for an equivalent number of precedents. Thus, each principle may
fit some precedents that the other principle cannot account for,
while failing to fit some of the precedents that the other principle
requires. When this happens, the two competing principles will fit
the precedents equally well. The judge must then adopt that princi-
ple which will best justify the precedents overall (or, at least, those
precedents on which the two principles converge) from the point of
view of the community's political morality. But this selection process
in reality requires engaging the judge's own political convictions and
relying on the judge's own moral judgment in completing a con-
structive interpretation of the common law.
98
This requirement introduces a deep and intractable tension
into Dworkin's theory of law, because that same theory also provides
that there is always, even in hard cases, a single right answer to any
legal dispute. Legal interpretation is properly directed to arriving at
that right answer, and the past political acts of the community pro-
vide some external constraint on that interpretation. But this exter-
nal constraint of fit is not, by itself, sufficient to ensure that the
interpreter will arrive at the right answer. The constraint of fit nar-
rows the field of viable principles, but it does not necessarily
uniquely determine a single correct principle. So Dworkin adds the
additional interpretive constraint of political justification. This con-
straint, however, even though "phenomenologically genuine," turns
out to be entirely "internal" or "subjective," because it not only al-
lows but requires different judges to reach different interpretations of
the law in hard cases according to their differing political
convictions. 9 9
Consequently, the interpretive constraint of political justifica-
tion will only uniquely determine the "correct" principle for a single
judge or, perhaps, those judges who share the same interpretively
relevant political convictions. Clearly, then, the additional con-
straint of political justification cannot bring judges with divergent
political convictions any closer to an interpretive consensus than the
constraint of fit already has. So, to the extent that different judges in
a pluralistic society can hear the common law speaking with a single
voice, each will hear it speaking in the voice of the judge's own in-
terpretive community. Thus, because Dworkin has not demon-
strated how constructive interpretation must in theory yield the
right answer in hard cases, the logical and epistemological connec-
98. LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 228-32.
99. Id. at 235.
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tions, if any, between his theory of constructive interpretation, his
model of common-law adjudication, and his right answer thesis re-
main unclear.' 00
B. Statutory Construction
Dworkin next conducts an exhaustive critique of approaches to
statutory interpretation that rely on the enigmatic notion of legisla-
tive intention. The theory underlying this practice is that statutes
are communicative acts between the legislature and the public.
Thus, to construe a statute is to discern a speaker's meaning. This
view results in numerous problems. For instance, whose intentions
count, only legislators who voted for the statute (and for reasons of
principle?); or those who voted against it but influenced its drafting?
What determines a legislator's intention: the legislator's hopes,
desires, or convictions?' Since a person's stated convictions can
conflict or be misleading, reliable evidence of a legislator's domi-
nant convictions will be found only in the legislator's actual political
behavior. But this suggests that the speaker's meaning theory in-
vites an intractable hermeneutic circle: in seeking to understand a
statute we look to legislative intent-understood as an aggregation
of the intentions of individual legislators-which directs us to deter-
mine the legislators' convictions, which in turn requires that we first
understand the legislators' political acts, which include, of course,
the very statute we are trying to construe.
10 2
The way to avoid this circle, according to Dworkin, is to inter-
pret the statute constructively as expressing principles and policies
that show it to fit and justify the best available historical narrative of
its surrounding political events-that is, the political acts of the
community. This narrative must include not only those events lead-
ing to the enactment of the statute, but also its subsequent applica-
tion within the context of related political events and larger or
100. See generally, Bix, Dancing in the Dark: The Philosophical Moves of Ronald Dworkin, 23
HARV.J. LEGIS. 307, 318-19 (1986); Hoy, Interpreting the Law, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 135, 174-
76 (1985).
101. These are not synonymous. An excellent argument can be made that the eco-
nomic or cost-benefit analysis of law commits a logical category mistake by reductively
analyzing citizens' (or legislators') convictions about public policy (their "public prefer-
ences") in terms of their subjective desires (their "private preferences"). See, e.g., Sagoff,
Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1393 (1981) (economics can
measure the intensity with which we hold our beliefs but cannot evaluate those beliefs
on their merits because pricing convictions as market externalities confuses a -private
individual's wants with what the individual, as a citizen, believes is best for the
community).
102. LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 334.
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complimentary statutory schemes.' 03 Dworkin illustrates his discus-
sion of statutory interpretation with occasional allusions to the
problems that surrounded the construction of the Endangered Spe-
cies Act' in the controversial Snail Darter case.' 0 5 Although his
discussion is occupied largely with problems rooted in the legisla-
tive history of statutes, 0 6 its attractions are substantial 0 7 and do
much to bolster Dworkin's insistence on a constructive rather than a
conversational interpretation of the law.
But Dworkin's argument that the speaker's meaning theory of
legislative intention necessarily entails a hermeneutic circle is less
convincing. Dworkin's hermeneutic circle only arises if legislative
intent is wholly reducible to the intentions of individual legislators.
This reduction and the relevance of Dworkin's contention that indi-
vidual legislator's intentions cannot be coherently aggregated are
both premised on Dworkin's assumption that the speaker's meaning
view necessarily commits its adherents to treating the intention of a
statute as a theoretical construction, "a compendious statement of
the discrete intentions of particular actual people, because only
these can actually have conversational intentions of the sort he has
in mind."' 08
But it is not immediately clear why this should be so. Dworkin
allows that conversational interpretation can be addressed to a com-
munity personified,' 0 9 and he argues at length that corporations can
103. Id. at 337-54.
104. The Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205. § 7, 87 Stat. 884
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1982)).
105. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
106. See LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 342-50. For a general discussion of other is-
sues in, and approaches to, statutory interpretation, see W. REYNOLDS,JUDICIAL PROCESS
IN A NUTSHELL (1980); R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STAT-
UTES (1975); Sykes, A Modest Proposal for a Change in Maryland's StatutesQuo, 43 MD. L.
REV. 647 (1984).
107. Thomas Grey has praised Dworkin's chapter on statutory interpretation as "per-
haps the finest treatment of this subject in the legal literature." Grey, Advice for Judge
and Company', in THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, Mar. 12, 1987.
108. LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 315. Dworkin remarks that it is
a metaphysical mistake to take the "intention" of the legislature itself as pri-
mary so long as [we subscribe to] ... some mental-state version of the speaker's
meaning theory of legislative intent. So long as we think legislative intention is
a matter of what someone has in mind and means to communicate by a vote, we
must take as primary the mental states of particular people because institutions
do not have minds, and then we must worry about how to consolidate individ-
ual intentions into a collective, fictitious group intention.
109. Some qualification is in order. Dworkin argues that conversational interpreta-
tion addressed to the community personified is not the appropriate method for inter-
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be personified." 0 Thus, there is no apparent reason why other in-
stitutions within the community, such as a legislative body, cannot
be personified as well. If this is right, then conversational interpre-
tation can be addressed to the legislature personified, and the prob-
lem of aggregating legislators' individual intentions need not be one
that dogs the speaker's meaning approach to statutory construction.
This nonreductive version of the speaker's meaning theory is often
implicit in the reasoning of judicial opinions construing statutes,'
and it takes the individual remarks in the legislative record (prior to
enactment) only as evidence of the irreducible intent of a personi-
fied legislature that has found partial expression in the statute it-
preting the independent purpose or point of a social practice that has been adopted by
that community since
if we assume that the community is a distinct person with opinions and convic-
tions of its own . .. that assumption only adds to the story a further person
whose opinions an interpreter must judge and contest, not simply discover and
report. He must still distinguish... between the opinion the group conscious-
ness has about what [the practice) requires, which he thinks he can discover by
reflecting on its distinct motives and purposes, and what he, the interpreter,
thinks [the practice] really requires.
Id. at 65.
Thus, while conversational interpretation is by Dworkin's account inappropriately
directed to social practices, Dworkin allows that conversational interpretation may be
addressed to the community personified to determine its opinions, convictions, and,
presumably, its intentions.
I 10. Id. at 168-75.
I 11. See, e.g., Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976). In Union Electric, the
Supreme Court considered whether the technology-forcing three-year mandate of the
Clean Air Act § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1982)) was
intended to take into account economic or technological infeasibility. In construing this
section of the statute, Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, examined some brief
remarks in the Congressional Record made by Senator Muskie, manager of the Senate bill,
and some Senate Committee discussions, and concluded therefrom that Congress in-
tended to foreclose industry claims of economic or technological infeasibility. Id. at
258-59. It would be folly indeed to suppose that the Court's quest for congressional
intent required itfirst to draw an incredibly weak inductive inference from the conversa-
tionally interpreted intentions of Senator Muskie (and a few committee members) to the
individual intentions of all the remaining members of Congress and then to aggregate
the individual intentions of all of the members of Congress into a compendious state-
ment of the congressional intent of the statute. Instead, the more plausible hypothesis
concerning judicial reasoning about legislative intent provides that courts, in cases such
as Union Electric, treat individual legislator's statements in the record merely as one im-
portant type of evidence which supports in varying degrees different direct inferences to
a primary and irreducible intention of the legislature in enacting a statute. Although it
raises practical problems concerning the proper weight to be accorded the evidence in
drawing such inferences, this version of the speaker's meaning view avoids the aggrega-
tive problem-and the resulting hermeneutic circle-that Dworkin attributes to all statu-
tory construction that relies on an appeal to the notion of legislative intent.
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self.'" 2 Dworkin cannot dismiss this personified speaker's meaning
approach to the conversational interpretation of statutes by sub-
suming it under one of the alternatives he considers-a two-step ap-
proach that combines intentions of individual legislators versus a
one-step approach that constructively interprets the convictions of
the legislature itself so as best to justify what it has done' '5-be-
cause he sharply distinguishes conversational interpretation from
constructive interpretation.
The distinction between conversational and constructive inter-
pretation does not require that a complete and adequate account of
statutory construction employ exclusively one interpretive approach
or the other. Dworkin seems, nevertheless, to suppose that, because
the two approaches are exhaustive alternatives for a single interpre-
tive act, they would be incommensurate components of a single co-
herent theory of interpretation. This explains, perhaps, why
Dworkin dispenses with the language of legislative intent-an inter-
pretive discourse widely recognized as an essential pre-interpretive
datum of our legal practice of construing statutes' ' 4-as sympto-
matic of a misguided effort to interpret and understand the legisla-
tive purpose of a statute.' 15
112. The notion of a personified legislature finds expression in John Chipman Gray's
observation that
the difficulties of ... interpretation arise when the Legislature has had no
meaning at all; when the question . . . on the statute never occurred to it; when
what the judges have to do is, not to determine what the Legislature did mean
on a point which was present to its mind, but to guess what it would have in-
tended on a point not present to its mind ....
J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAw 173 (1921).
113. LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 336.
114. See id. at 18-23 (discussing the views ofJudge Earl and Justices Burger and Powell
on the proper role of legislative intention in the construction and application of
statutes).
115. Dworkin states that our legal practice treats statements of legislative purpose
made on the floor by individual legislators or in the reports of committees as especially
important in construing a statute and that our courts in reading a statute attach consid-
erable weight to these privileged statements because they are themselves acts of the
state personified. Id. at 342-45. This description of the legislature's activities implicitly
suggests that statements in the formal legislative history are properly characterized as
evidence only of the purpose of a statute and not of a legislative intention of how the
statute should be applied in the case at hand. Once this description is accepted as ex-
hausting the interpretive relevance of the legislative history, the search for legislative
intention is viewed as an ill-conceived attempt to understand the purpose of a statute. It
is upon this procrustean bed that Dworkin lays his exclusively constructive approach to
statutory interpretation. For a discussion of the distinction between legislative purpose
and intent, see W. REYNOLDS, supra note 106, at 210-15 ("intent" refers to a solution
contemplated with respect to a specific application of the statute; "purpose" refers to
general policies and legislative objectives that transcend a particular application).
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The possibility that the conversational interpretation of legisla-
tive intent may survive critical scrutiny does not, however, preclude
a necessary role for the constructive interpretation of statutes. Nor
does it require the interpretive community to subscribe, as Dworkin
supposes, to the notion of a canonical moment in which a statute is
enacted and imbued with all the meaning it can ever have." t 6 Dwor-
kin correctly contends that textual integrity in the construction of
statutes is sensitive to the passage of time. The constructive inter-
pretation of a statute places that statute in a temporal political con-
text and aims to provide the best fit and justification for that statute
relative to subsequent legislation and decisions that other courts
have made construing that statute." 7 Thus, textual integrity does
not require the judicial amendment of out-of-date statutes but re-
sults, instead, in the gradual interpretive accretion of meaning to
statutes over time. The fact, however, that courts have less reason
to rely on statements in the legislative history as a statute ages
serves to underscore the importance of those statements to the in-
terpretation of the legislative intention for younger statutes.
C. Constitutional Law
In discussing the Constitution,"' s Dworkin again begins with a
lesson on how not to interpret the law. First, Dworkin argues that
various categorical dichotomies currently prevailing in the practice
and academic theory of constitutional law-such as conservatism vs.
liberalism and interpretivism vs. non-interpretivism-are oversim-
plified or misleading and illusory." 9 Two approaches in particular
are singled out for detailed scrutiny: historicism and passivism.
Historicism is the view that acceptable interpretations of the
Constitution must yield principles that express the historical or orig-
inal intentions of the framers. The problem with this view is that it
decides nothing because the framers had several political convic-
tions pertinent to an issue such as racial discrimination that were
116. LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 348.
117. Id. at 349-50.
118. For an earlier account of Dworkin's views on interpreting the common law, stat-
utes, and the Constitution, see R. DWORKIN, Hard Cases and Constitutional Cases, in TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81, 131 (1977).
119. LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 357-60, 363. For a defense of interpretivism, or
the view that non-interpretive review is illegitimate, see Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 INo. L.J. I (1971). Criticism of Bork's view and a defense of
non-interpretive review--or constitutional review that accommodates values outside
those constitutionalized by the framers, provided they do not conflict with the Constitu-
tion-is found in M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982).
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abstract or concrete to varying degrees. Dworkin argues that the
framers' dominant conviction was abstract-that the Constitution
required that all citizens be afforded the equal protection of the
laws. Their more concrete conviction may have been that racial seg-
regation was consistent with equal protection. But determining
whether these convictions conflict 20 or not itself depends on the
best interpretation that we can give of the abstract conviction.
While Dworkin acknowledges that our concern for certainty or sta-
bility in the law may sometimes incline us to favor more concrete
intentions, he argues that this concern carries less weight in consti-
tutional law than in other areas.' 2 ' This is because integrity favors
interpretations of our fundamental political rights that express a
principled and coherent conception of justice, and "principles can-
not be seen as stopping where some historical statesman's time, im-
agination, and interest stopped." 22 Thus, historicism does not take
rights seriously in the way the Constitution requires.
Passivism is the view that democratic theory requires judges to
defer to the legislatures because, as representatives of the people,
legislators should decide what the Constitution guarantees and re-
quires. This approach appeals to the political virtue of fairness by
arguing that an interpretation of the Constitution will be fairer, and
thus better, if it reflects political values and convictions that find
broad popular support in the community rather than convictions
that are alien to the community.' 23 Passivism, moreover, assumes
that legislatures will, over the long run, develop a more coherent
conception of justice and minority rights than courts can by inter-
preting abstract constitutional provisions. But this faith is mis-
placed; it is unlikely that legislators will codify a scheme of minority
rights, no matter how principled, that is deeply unpopular with their
constituents.' 21 Thus, passivism's concern for fairness-a political
virtue properly dominant in decisions of policy-slights integrity's
demand that fundamental individual constitutional rights flow in a
principled way from a coherent conception of justice.
120. A good argument can be made that the framers themselves did not believe that
anything could violate the fourteenth amendment except what they believed would vio-
late it. This suggests that the framers believed they were not infallible and that some of
their more concrete convictions could conflict erroneously with their more abstract con-
victions. See Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885
(1985).
121. LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 367.
122. Id. at 368-69.
123. Id. at 374.
124. Id. at 376.
19881 603
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
The overall goal of constitutional law is to provide interpreta-
tions of the Constitution that are foundational in that they "fit and
justify the most basic arrangements of political power in the com-
munity." 25 Dworkin provides an example of such an interpretation
by considering three theories of racial equality that respectively em-
ploy the ideas of suspect classifications, banned categories and
banned sources. The suspect classifications theory treats a person's
right against discrimination merely as a consequence of a more gen-
eral ight to be treated as an equal according to the conception of
equality prevalent in the state. Race and other -suspect classifica-
tions are special on this account only because history suggests that
members of these groups are likely to be denied the equal concern
and respect afforded others on a rational basis. Thus, there is no
distinct right to be protected from discrimination beyond what the
"rationality" standard requires. The banned categories theory insists
that the Constitution recognizes a distinct right that persons have
against discrimination as a trump over the state's conception of the
general welfare. This right precludes distinguishing groups of citi-
zens for different treatment on the basis of certain categories, such
as race, ethnic background, or gender, even when the intended dif-
ferential treatment would benefit members of those groups or
would advance an otherwise permissible conception of the general
interest. The banned sources theory recognizes a special right against
discrimination or differential treatment when it results from certain
collective preferences or choices. When these collective preferences
are rooted in some form of prejudice against a particular group,
they can never be counted in favor of adopting or retaining policies
that promote or permit the disadvantage of that group. The inter-
pretation preferred by integrity will flow from that conception of
equality which provides the best overall fit and justification of Brown
v. Board of Education 126 and Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke. 127
Dworkin concludes that the banned sources theory meets this
125. Id. at 380. Dworkin adds that this foundational justification of the most basic
arrangements of political power
must be a justification drawn from the most philosophical reaches of political
theory. Lawyers are always philosophers, because jurisprudence is part of any
lawyer's account of what the law is, even when the jurisprudence is undist-
inguished and mechanical. In constitutional theory philosophy is closer to the
surface of the argument and, if the theory is good, explicit in it.
Id.
126. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
127. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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interpretive test. Both the banned categories theory and the banned
sources theory sufficiently rule out ordinary racial discrimination. 
2 8
But there is a crucial difference: the banned categories theory pre-
cludes differential treatment based on the category of race,' 29 while
the banned sources theory precludes differential treatment that re-
sults from reasons or preferences rooted in racial prejudice.' The
banned categories theory, it turns out, is color-blind to a fault. It
results in an interpretation of the equal protection clause that fails
to fit all of the precedents, notably Bakke, Is' and fails to justify reme-
dial programs that eradicate the effects of racial prejudice. So the
banned catagories interpretation would hold reverse discrimination
to be unconstitutional. The banned sources interpretation, on the
other hand, fits Brown and Bakke equally well'3 2 and justifies them
both by appealing to the principle that ordinary discrimination is
unconstitutional, not because it results in differential treatment, but
because it results from unjust preferences. Many statutes that treat
people differently due to properties beyond their control are consti-
tutional. Thus, the injustice of discrimination is explained only by
the banned sources theory of equality.'
Although Dworkin's treatment of equal protection law is attrac-
tive, his account of constitutional law generally is incomplete and
does little to suggest the outlines of a comprehensive theoretical ap-
proach to interpreting the Constitution. Instead, Dworkin is con-
tent merely to observe that his hypothetical Justice Hercules escapes
the standard academic classifications of Justices, and his interven-
tion in the process of government to declare some act of govern-
ment unconstitutional is done solely in the service of his
conscientious political judgment about "what democracy really is
and what the Constitution . . .really means." ''  While this piece-
meal approach is to be commended, perhaps, to Justices of lesser
ability, it does not seem too much to ask Hercules for a positive
account of how integrity would construct theoretical and interpre-
tive connections between equal protection doctrine and other areas
of constitutional jurisprudence concerned with principles of federal-
ism, privacy, and due process.
128. LAw's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 388.
129. Id. at 383-84.
130. Id. at 384-87.
131. Id. at 394.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 395.
134. Id. at 397-99.
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VII. THE CONFLICT OF INTEGRITY AND JUSTICE
Finally, Dworkin considers the problem of perspective. Dworkin
contends that a fully adequate interpretation of our law must pro-
vide a vision of law that is broad enough to encompass law's past, its
institutions, and its ideals; it must ultimately provide a vision of our
community and our statecraft that combines practical politics with
utopian political theory. But Dworkin's elaboration of this vision
raises more questions than it settles, and it suggests some funda-
mental tensions in his interpretation of law that the reader may
sense at various points throughout the book.
For instance, Dworkin remarks in an earlier discussion that con-
flicts may arise between the integrity and justice of an institution
that are so intractable that the best interpretation of the practice
must still show it to be pervasively unjust. When this occurs, we
must abandon the practice and "deny that [it] can impose genuine
obligations at all .... [T]he obligations it purports to impose are
wholly cancelled by competing moral principle.""3 5 Thus, integrity
is necessary but not sufficient to justify coercive political decisions.
Nevertheless, there is an ambiguity in this formulation because
it implicitly appeals to two concepts ofjustification that are trying to
do the work of one. It is rather the case that integrity is legally neces-
sary but not legally sufficient-because it is not morally and politically
sufficient-to justify coercion. Alternatively, a political decision
pursuant to a given system of law may itself be legally justified in the
minimal sense that the decision formally fits or comports with the
existing grounds of law in that system. But that decision may not be
legally sufficient to support or justify political coercion because it
may fail to have the force of law-that is, it may not be morally or
politically justified by the most basic principles that flow from the
interpretive community's conception of justice.
It may be that in a particularly corrupt legal system, these two
forms of justification will not converge for a particular decision.
This is possible because integrity is not necessarily sovereign over
the virtues of justice and fairness, though it is sovereign over the
grounds of law."3 6 Thus, a judge charged with administering Nazi
law would have no legal grounds for freeing Jews, but would, under
Dworkin's interpretation, have moral or political reasons that would
justify and require doing so.
This suggests, first, that Dworkin's view of law is in one respect
135. Id. at 203.
136. Id. at 217-18.
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not so remote from Hart's. Both views allow that the grounds of law
may exist and operate independently of any moral principles that we
could recognize as justifying that law. Second, such grounds of law
cannot for us have the force of law because our interpretation of
them cannot provide a moral or political justification of state coer-
cion flowing from those grounds. What will have the force of law
for us, in such circumstances, is the demand that we sacrifice integ-
rity, and thus the grounds of law, to the political principles ofjustice
and fairness that prevail in our interpretive community. Thus, there
is room in Dworkin's view for a sense in which civil disobedience can
be legally as well as morally required.
But Dworkin does not wish to part lightly with integrity, be-
cause it politically bonds a pluralistic community by requiring it to
develop its law in an historically principled way, rather than by com-
promising those aspects of the community's conception of justice
that still remain controversial and unsettled. So Dworkin argues,
first, that a judge who accepts law as integrity must have convictions
about fit that are minimally checked by the community's actual polit-
ical history."3 7 Fit must be independent of convictions about the
kinds ofjustification that show the practice in its best light, if fit is to
constrain the justification available for a practice.13 8 Later, however,
he seems to render this requirement vacuous by arguing that a
judge's convictions about fit are always political and not mechanical,
because all of the dimensions of interpretation are in the final analy-
sis responsive to the judge's political judgment."3 9
These submerged tensions-some would say contradictions-in
Dworkin's interpretation of law as integrity work themselves to the
surface in the final pages of the book. To understand why law as
integrity "not only permits but fosters different forms of substantive
conflict or tension within the overall best interpretation of law" 4o it'
is necessary to distinguish inclusive integrity from pure integrity.
Inclusive integrity requires that judges interpret the present law
of the community to express, so far as possible, coherent principles
of political fairness, substantive justice, and procedural due process
137. Id. at 255.
138. Id. at 67-68.
139. id. at 257. Dworkin writes that "[the constraint fit imposes on substance... is
. . . the constraint of one type of political conviction on another . . . . It is not the
constraint of external hard fact or of interpersonal consensus." Id. The above passage
and others, id. at 67-68, suggest difficulties in Dworkin's account of law as interpretation,
understood as a philosophical theory about the nature of law. See Levenbook, The Sus-
tained Dworkin, 53 U. CMt. L. REV. 1108 (1986).
140. L~w's EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 404.
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combined in the right relation. 4 This adjudicative interpretation
must account for all the political virtues, and this will inevitably re-
quire that some decisions pull against and so fall short of a com-
pletely coherent expression of substantive justice. Our concrete,
actual law is thus fixed by an inclusive integrity that requires judges
to declare and enforce the present law.' 42 Dworkin believes, how-
ever, that such decisions usually will, as a practical matter, exhibit
our community's substantive conception of justice well enough to
justify political coercion.
Nevertheless, integrity alone cannot guarantee that a decision
can justify political coercion. And where it does, the horizontal sys-
temic constraints of inclusive integrity insure that the decision's
conception of justice is or will soon be surpassed by purer concep-
tions of justice that develop and gain acceptance within the political
community. This explains, perhaps, why many political philoso-
phers have tended to neglect the ideal of integrity. Their gaze has
been fixed, instead, on a brighter beacon that can enlighten, as well
as justify, the exercise of power, namely justice.143
Dworkin sees this light, but only through the lens of integrity:
"We bow to justice, among the political virtues, by creating for it a
special form of integrity." '44 This is pure integrity. Its purpose is to
avert the community's sidelong glance from its historic, institutional
duties and constraints so that it may focus on reforms that serve
more comprehensively its vision of social justice.'4 But our com-
munity is pluralistic. Although we are united in our commitment to
141. Id. at 405.
142. Id. at 406.
143. Rawls observes that
in times of social doubt and loss of faith in long established values, there is a
tendency to fall back on ihe virtues of integrity: truthfulness and sincerity, lu-
cidity and commitment .... If no one knows what is true, at least we can make
our beliefs our own .... If the traditional moral rules are no longer relevant
and we cannot agree which ones should take their place, we can in any event
decide with a clear head how we mean to act .... Now of course the virtues of
integrity are virtues, and among them the excellences of free persons. Vet while
necessary, they are not sufficient; for their definition allows for most any content: a tyrant
might display these attributes to a high degree .... It is impossible to con-
struct a moral view from these virtues alone; being virtues of form they are in a
sense secondary. But joined to the appropriate conception ofjustice ... they come into
their own.
J. RAWLS, supra note 54, at 519-20 (emphasis added). For other recent discussions of
justice, see M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
(1983); B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
144. LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 6, at 406.
145. Id. at 406-07.
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integrity and to certain shared principles of justice, our divergent,
competitive visions of justice pull us in different directions.
Thus, Dworkin's lens of integrity is bifocal; it splits our image of
justice and the political community's image of itself. For this reason,
his interpretation of law as integrity is in the end mysterious and
puzzling. Integrity is the great unifying political virtue of our plural-
istic community. Yet his interpretation of integrity is not itself uni-
tary because it does not provide a ruling conception of integrity that
is sovereign over both inclusive and pure integrity. How do our
community's competing, utopian dreams of law prevail upon or
from within our fixed, present law without compromising either in-
clusive integrity or pure integrity? Thomas Grey posed the question
well: "How is the metaphoric commonwealth.... with its independ-
ent and public spirited citizenry, to coexist in integrity with .. .the
legal and judicial empire of princes, prophets, and superhuman
heroes?"' 46
VIII. CONCLUSION
Had Ronald Dworkin never written anything after Taking Rights
Seriously, his place in twentieth century Anglo-American jurispru-
dence would have been secure. But with Law's Empire, he surpasses
his excellent earlier essays and gives us a sustained and attractive
theory of jurisprudence. In it Dworkin develops a wealth of power-
ful, detailed arguments and ideas that connect with each other and
with the broad range of complex, related issues they are designed to
address. The book is not without its faults. And it has its share of
rhetorical flourishes, many inspired, which will annoy and distract
some critics. But it is written in Dworkin's usual lively, elegant style,
and with as much clarity as the subject permits.
Law's Empire makes a number of enduring, if imperfect, contri-
butions to modern jurisprudence. Chief among these are its devel-
opment of a theory of constructive interpretation, its treatment of
law as an interpretive concept, its account of political obligation and
legitimacy, and its argument that integrity is a politically necessary
dynamic in any adequate interpretation of our law. Moreover, the
book makes another less tangible, but even more important, contri-
bution to our jurisprudence. It will attract critics from the political
146. Grey, supra note 107. The images allude to Dworkin's statement that "[tihe
courts are the capitals of law's empire, and judges are its princes, but not its seers and
prophets. It falls to philosophers, if they are willing, to work out law's ambitions for
itself, the purer form of law within and beyond the law we have." LAw's EMPIRE, supra
note 6, at 407.
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right and left of the legal community for years to come. Because of
this critical convergence, Law's Empire is destined to ensure a central
role for liberal political theory in shaping and influencing the course
of contemporary jurisprudence into the next century.
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